W3-Macondo

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Macondo (W3-Macondo) on 4 Jan 2023: 23 findings, 0 critical; 11 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 8 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Macondo’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings23

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium011
Low8010
LowOut of Scope DependenciesOpen

The contract `MacondoMCDVestingEcosystemWallet` is importing and inheriting from contracts that are outside the scope of this audit. The scope of the audit treats these entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, these contracts could have security issues and this may lead to exploits.

LowRedundant Code ComponentsOpen

The linked functions are `internal` and never used in the scope of this audit.

LowRisk For Weak RandomnessOpen

In the contract `OnChainRandomUpgradeable.sol`, the function `_getRandom()` is supposed to return a random number. \ To do so the many parameter will be encoded and then the hash of the encoding is computed to return an `uint256`. The parameters used seem to be potentially influenceable, for example: - `_index` and `msg.sender` can be chosen - `blockhash` and `block.difficulty` can be influenced by miners to some degree or predicted. Although this function is internal, so the whole context of use is not inside the scope of this audit ; using block variables to generate randomness is considered bad practice and is not recommended.

LowThird Party DependencyOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=12 VRFCoordinatorV2Interface COORDINATOR; ``` - The contract `RandomOracleConsumer` interacts with third party contract with `VRFCoordinatorV2Interface` interface via `COORDINATOR`.

LowToo Many DigitsOpen

Literals with many digits are difficult to read and review. ```solidity=35 uint32 callbackGasLimit = 300000; ``` --- ```solidity=37 _mint(msg.sender, 1000000000 * 10**decimals()); ```

LowUnnecessary Use of SafeMathUpgradeableOpen

The `SafeMathUpgradeable` library is used unnecessarily. With Solidity compiler versions 0.8.0 or newer, arithmetic operations will automatically revert in case of integer overflow or underflow.

LowUnused Custom ErrorOpen

```solidity=19 error ErrorSaleRoleSignature(address signer); ``` - `ErrorSaleRoleSignature` is declared but never used. --- ```solidity=20 error ErrorSaleRoleCannotSaleToSelf(); ``` - `ErrorSaleRoleCannotSaleToSelf` is declared but never used.

LowWeak RandomnessOpen

In the contract `OnChainRandomUpgradeable`, the function `_getRandomBySeed()` depends on only two parameters, it cannot be considered as truly random since the result could be easily predictable. ---- In the contract `PokerValidator`, the function `_getRandom()` depends on `OnChainRandomUpgradeable._getRandomBySeed()` to return a value, since the result would still be easily predictable the function cannot be considered as truly random.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (11)

  • contracts/token/nft-table/MacondoTableNFTMinterBlindBox.sol
  • contracts/core/utils/random/OnChainRandomUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/token/token-MCD/MacondoMCD.sol
  • contracts/game/poker/PokerValidator.sol
  • contracts/core/nft-store/NFTStoreSellerIncrease.sol
  • contracts/core/nft-store/NFTStore.sol
  • contracts/token/token-MCD/MacondoMCDVestingEcosystemWallet.sol
  • contracts/token/token-BFB/MacondoBFB.sol
  • contracts/token/nft-table/MacondoTableNFT.sol
  • contracts/random/RandomOracleConsumer.sol
  • contracts/TokenCollection.sol

Part of Macondo’s security record

Macondo
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Macondo’s security record

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