Cheelee

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Cheelee on 7 Feb 2023: 14 findings, 0 critical; 11 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Cheelee’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings14

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium001
Low0010
HighCentralization Risks in `CHEEL.sol` and `LEE.sol`Open

In the contract `CHEEL` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint a large amount of tokens to an address he/she controls, as well as burn any amount of tokens from any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6525e554093a4b3ba2a63e740b9b1f52/diagrams/centralization_CHEEL-CHEEL-_owner.svg) ---- In the contract `LEE` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint a large amount of tokens to an address he/she controls, as well as burn any amount of tokens from any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6525e554093a4b3ba2a63e740b9b1f52/diagrams/centralization_LEE-LEE-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in `MultiVesting.sol`Open

In the contract `MultiVesting` the role `_oldBeneficiary` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_oldBeneficiary` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the `_beneficiaryAddress` to an address he/she controls, which will eventually receive tokens from the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f09d4b979db04f2eabe09dc8d5978e1e/diagrams/centralization_MultiVesting-MultiVesting-_oldBeneficiary.svg) ---- In the contract `MultiVesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and wipe the contract of all tokens using the `emergancyVest()` function, as well as set the address of the `seller` to an address he/she controls. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f09d4b979db04f2eabe09dc8d5978e1e/diagrams/centralization_MultiVesting-MultiVesting-_owner.svg) ---- In the contract `MultiVesting` the role `seller` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `seller` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and call the `vest()` function with the `_beneficiaryAddress` set to addresses he/she controls, which will eventually receive tokens from the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f09d4b979db04f2eabe09dc8d5978e1e/diagrams/centralization_MultiVesting-MultiVesting-seller.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in `NFT.sol` and `NFTSale.soOpen

In the contract `NFT` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create an unlimited amount of NFT's to send to addresses he/she controls, change the URIs of NFTs, which points to a location where a user can find the token's JSON description, and provided privileged roles to addresses he/she controls. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6525e554093a4b3ba2a63e740b9b1f52/diagrams/centralization_NFT-NFT-_owner.svg) In the contract `NFT` the roles `nftSale` and `treasury` have authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `nftSale` and `treasury` accounts may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create an unlimited amount of NFT's to send to addresses he/she controls. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6525e554093a4b3ba2a63e740b9b1f52/diagrams/centralization_NFT-NFT-nftSale.svg) ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6525e554093a4b3ba2a63e740b9b1f52/diagrams/centralization_NFT-NFT-treasury.svg) ---- In the contract `NFTSale` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and wipe the contract of all its ether, change the `pricePerToken` to a value he/she could benefit from, pause purchasing and/or redeeming, which disrupts contract functionality, change the `signer` to an addresses he/she controls to redeem unlimited tokens, and lastly change the values of `redeemSupply` and `purchaseSupply`, which could also disrupt contract functionality. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f09d4b979db04f2eabe09dc8d5978e1e/diagrams/centralization_NFTSale-NFTSale-_owner.svg)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (10)

  • contracts/LEE.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/CustomNFT.sol
  • contracts/Staking.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IERC20Mintable.sol
  • contracts/NFTSale.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IVesting.sol
  • contracts/CHEEL.sol
  • contracts/Treasury.sol
  • contracts/MultiVesting.sol
  • contracts/NFT.sol

Part of Cheelee’s security record

Cheelee
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Cheelee’s security record

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