CertiK reviewed Socrates (Socrates v2 Audit) on 4 Oct 2023: 6 findings, 0 critical; 3 acknowledged, 3 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 3 | 0 | 0 |
There is no storage gap preserved in the `ExternalEarlyBird` base contract. Any logic contract that acts as a base contract that needs to be inherited by other upgradeable child should have a reasonable size of storage gap preserved for the new state variable introduced by the future upgrades.
Signed messages are not properly verified with the current chain ID, thus allowing attackers to perform replay attacks across chains. Hardcoded or cached chain ID values are also vulnerable since a hard fork may occur and change the chain ID in the future. ```solidity=50 require(signerAddress == ecrecover(messageDigest, v, r, s), "Socrates: Signature mismatch"); ``` - Calling `ecrecover` with a hash that does not properly include the chain ID.
The for loop contains repeated storage read access in the condition check. Given that the ending condition does not change in the for loop, the repeated storage read is unnecessary, and its associated high gas cost can be eliminated. ```solidity=76 for (uint256 i = 1; i < portions.length; i++) { ``` Loop condition `i < portions.length` accesses the `length` field of a storage array. --- ```solidity=103 for (uint256 i = 0; i < portions.length; i++) { ``` Loop condition `i < portions.length` accesses the `length` field of a storage array.
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Repository and files the report names (9)
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