SpaceFi -xEVMOSToken

QuillAuditsFiles named in the report

Audit · firm’s term: audit report

QuillAudits reviewed SpaceFi 2.0 (SpaceFi -xEVMOSToken) on 19 Jan 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SpaceFi 2.0’s security record

Report hosted on quillaudits.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium100
Low100
HighReentrancyOpen

Line 415function finalizeRedeem(uint256 redeemIndex) external validateRedeem(msg.sender, redeemIndex) { Above function does not follow checks effects interaction patterns where an external call is made in internal function Line 444 _finalizeRedeem() and an attacker contract can reenter the finalizeRedeem function again to get same EvmosAmount on the same RedeemInfo in userRedeems that has not yet been deleted which only happens in Line 436 _deleteRedeemEntry(redeemIndex);

HighUnprotected InitializeOpen

Without clear documentation if the contracts make use of Hardhat plugins which ensure the initialize function is called when contracts Proxy deployed, it is possible to deploy contracts and forget to call initialize or it can be front run by an attacker taking over the contracts.

HighUpgradeable Best PractisesOpen

It is recommended for upgradeable contracts to not reinvent the wheel and follow best practices like making use of OpenZeppelin ERC20Upgradeable contracts, UUPS upgradeable pattern plus Hardhat Upgradeable plugins when creating and deploying upgradeable contracts. This safeguards from forgetting crucial upgrade logic, running initializers multiple times, not miss ERC20 compatibility,  not introducing errors or bugs by rewriting contracts, ensuring efficient safer contracts, not forgetting public mint functions(in cases where needed- in this case not needed), more compact and easier to reason, maintainability, modularity, and it follows best practises.

Medium1. Centralization Risks / Overpowered OwnershipOpen

Without clear documentation if the Ownable contract will make use of decentralised control such as MultiSig. The owner has control to update whitelists, update redeem settings, upgrade contracts. Any compromise to the Owner account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this.

Low1. Uninitialized and unused logicOpen

State variable Line 56 mapping(address => uint256) private _farmStakingBalances; is never initialised and or updated in the contracts or used in any other functionality. Function Line 155 function farmStakingBalancOf(address) will always return 0 for all addresses.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (9)

  • openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/SafeMathUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/XEvmosToken.sol
  • /docs.sol
  • openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol
  • openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol
  • XEvmosToken.sol
  • openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/ContextUpgradeable.sol
  • openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20Upgradeable.sol
  • openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol

Part of SpaceFi 2.0’s security record

SpaceFi 2.0
Audits3 audits by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2023, by QuillAudits.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open SpaceFi 2.0’s security record

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