Bridge Oracle (Hybrid Liquidity Mining) - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Bridge (Bridge Oracle (Hybrid Liquidity Mining) - Audit) on 18 Apr 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Bridge’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings5

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low103
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8f69f7f45ed145838445bcd0366341fc/diagrams/centralization_BRGPool-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `SmartChefFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8f69f7f45ed145838445bcd0366341fc/diagrams/centralization_BRGPool-SmartChefFactory-_owner.svg) In the contract `SmartChefInitializable` the role `SMART_CHEF_FACTORY` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `SMART_CHEF_FACTORY` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8f69f7f45ed145838445bcd0366341fc/diagrams/centralization_BRGPool-SmartChefInitializable-SMART_CHEF_FACTORY.svg) In the contract `SmartChefInitializable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8f69f7f45ed145838445bcd0366341fc/diagrams/centralization_BRGPool-SmartChefInitializable-_owner.svg)

LowThird Party DependencyOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=870 IBEP20 public rewardToken; ``` - The contract `SmartChefInitializable` interacts with third party contract with `IBEP20` interface via `rewardToken`. --- ```solidity=873 IBEP20 public stakedToken; ``` - The contract `SmartChefInitializable` interacts with third party contract with `IBEP20` interface via `stakedToken`. --- ```solidity=1031 function recoverWrongTokens(address _tokenAddress, uint256 _tokenAmount) external onlyOwner { ``` - The function `SmartChefInitializable.recoverWrongTokens` interacts with third party contract with `IBEP20` interface via `_tokenAddress`.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • BRGPool.sol

Part of Bridge’s security record

Bridge
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Apr 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
Open Bridge’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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