Huddle01

QuillAudits11 Sep 2024Files named in the report

Audit · firm’s term: audit report

QuillAudits reviewed Huddle01 on 11 Sep 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings

Open the report Open Huddle01’s security record

Report hosted on quillaudits.com.

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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Open	Fixed
Critical	0	0
High	0	0
Medium	2	0
Low	0	5

MediumCentralization IssueOpen

The sale contract is not only limited to track the number of sale tokens purchased. Users have to make payment into the contract without corresponding tokens immediately sent to the users. The protocol promises to airdrop an NFT in accordance with their lifecycle. However, the sale contract does not define or clarify how the NFT representation will work but it is dependent on the protocol to airdrop any amount of NFT to any amount of payment tokens made into the contract.

MediumImpossible to update undesirable public allocation value after sales has beganOpen

The setPublicAllocation is expected to be called by the contract owner or the assigned whitelist setter to set the value of public allocation. This is only before the start time period for the sale. This makes the setPublicAllocation impossible to call afterwards. If the protocol sets an undesirable value before start time, this leaves the protocol with no choice but to operate on that value. Another possible instance is deploying the sale contract with a start time set to the block.timestamp or to a closer time, and if setPublicAllocation was not invoked immediately, then publicAllocation will be 0. This leaves the contract nonfunctional and users won’t be able to interact with it.