Billiard Crypto has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 2 Feb 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
14 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 12 low (12 open, 2 acknowledged).
Centralization Risks in BilliardCrypto.sol
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Divide Before Multiply
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
ERC20 Approval Race Condition
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Function and variable naming does not match the o
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Sandwich Attacks
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Spenders With Infinite Allowance Handled Incorrec
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
State Variable Should Be Declared Constant
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Unchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` Ca
BilliardCrypto - Audit · CertiK · 2 Feb 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BilliardCrypto - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 12 low 2 acknowledged · 12 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 12 | 0 | 0 |
The internal call to `_transfer()` should only follow after the validation check for `currentAllowance` and `_approve()` is called. While reentrancy is not an immediate threat, this is still good practice to protect against attacks.
Open the reportPerforming integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation. ```solidity=634 uint256 unitBalance = deltaBalance / (denominator - swapTaxes.liquidity); ``` ```solidity=636 uint256 marketingAmt = unitBalance * 2 * swapTaxes.marketing; ```
Open the reportThe approval function of the ERC20 standard possesses a well-known vulnerability whereby two consecutive approvals can be exploited to instead “reset” the approval by consuming the approval that is meant to be replaced with a new one. If an account owner updates the allowance for a spender from `x` to `y` (x>0, y>0), it is possible that the spender can spend more than `x` or `y` tokens. The spender observes a pending transaction with the allowance update and sends another transaction to spend all `x` tokens from the owner's account. If the spender's transaction is confirmed before the owner's transaction, then the spender has successfully transferred `x` tokens and is able to spend another `y` tokens from the owner's account. As a result, the spender can transfer `x+y` tokens from the owner's account.
Open the reportThe variable `ethPairToAddLiquidityWith` refers to the number of `BUSD` that will be added to pancake pool, but its name starts with `eth`. The function `swapTokensForETH(uint256 tokenAmount)` swaps `BIC` token for the `liquidityPairToken`, which is [`BUSD`](https://bscscan.com/address/0xe9e7CEA3DedcA5984780Bafc599bD69ADd087D56) instead of ETH.
Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following line ***664*** is set to the slippage to **0**. ```solidity=653 function swapTokensForETH(uint256 tokenAmount) private { // generate the pancake pair path of token address[] memory path = new address[](2); path[0] = address(this); path[1] = liquidityPairToken; _approve(address(this), address(router), tokenAmount); // make the swap router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, path, address(liquifier), block.timestamp ); ``` The linked function `swapTokensForETH()` is called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering this function are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large.
Open the reportIt is expected that non-reverting invocations of `transferFrom()` that return `true` decrease the allowance of the address in `msg.sender` for the address in `sender` by the value in `amount`. An allowance that equals `type(uint256).max` is treated as an exception and interpreted as an unlimited allowance that does not need to be reduced in order for this check to pass. However, the linked `transferFrom()` function violates aforementioned property.
Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=456 uint256 private launchtax = 99; ``` - `launchtax` should be declared `constant`.
Open the reportThe return value of the following transfer()/transferFrom() calls are not checked: ```solidity=638 IERCliquidityPairToken.transferFrom(address(liquifier), marketingWallet, marketingAmt); ``` --- ```solidity=642 IERCliquidityPairToken.transferFrom(address(liquifier), address(this), finalBalance); ``` --- ```solidity=749 IERC20(tokenAdd).transfer(owner(), amount); ```
Open the reportThe return values of the following external call is not used or checked: ```solidity=433 IERC20(token).approve(msg.sender, uint(~uint256(0))); ``` --- ```solidity=491 IERCliquidityPairToken.approve(address(this), MAX); ``` --- ```solidity=492 IERCliquidityPairToken.approve(routerAdd, MAX); ``` --- ```solidity=676 router.addLiquidity( address(this), liquidityPairToken, tokenAmount, ethAmount, 0, // slippage is unavoidable 0, // slippage is unavoidable deadWallet, block.timestamp ); ```
Open the reportIt is not recommended to use Solidity's `transfer()` and `send()` functions for transferring BNB, since some contracts may not be able to receive the funds. Those functions forward only a fixed amount of gas (2300 specifically) and the receiving contracts may run out of gas before finishing the transfer. Also, gas costs may increase in the future. Thus, some contracts that can receive now may stop working in the future due to the gas limitation. ```solidity=744 payable(owner()).transfer(weiAmount); ``` - `BilliardCrypto.rescueBNB` uses `transfer()`.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`: ```solidity=443 address public pair; address public liquidityPairToken; ``` Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report`fee` is written twice, but not used in-between. ```solidity=573 fee = 0; ``` ```solidity=593 fee = (amount * feesum) / 100; ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xa775…66dc0xa7751516e06e1715264306a51437774bf94266dc | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Billiard Crypto, dated 2 Feb 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“BilliardCrypto - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Billiard Crypto.
14 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 12 low (12 open, 2 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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