Monster Galaxy

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Monster Galaxy on 20 Apr 2023: 15 findings, 0 critical; 8 marked fixed, 7 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Monster Galaxy’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings15

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium102
Low405
High`sender` Parameter In Function `trustWorldBatch()Open

In the contract `World`, the function `trustWorldBatch()` gets the first address in the `MetaverseStorage.authAddress[id]` and uses the address as the sender argument to pass to the function `WorldCore.trustWorld_()`. This logic is a little confusing because it is different from the logic in the functions `trustWorld()` and `trustWorldBWO()` where the sender is `_msgSender()`. This also increments nonces for the wrong sender. In addition, the function `trustWorld_()` in the contract `WorldCore` is expecting the `_msgSender` as the first parameter.

HighWrong Argument Passing in Function `createAccountOpen

The function `createAccountBatch()` calls the function `core().createAccount_()` with wrong arguments. The first parameter should be `_msgSender()` instead of `addrs[i]`. This will cause the `require` condition in the second code snippet in the function `MetaverseCore._createAccount()` to always be met. It also increments nonces for the wrong sender. ```solidity=9 function createAccountBatch(address[] calldata addrs, bool[] calldata isTrustAdmins) public onlyOwner { require(addrs.length == isTrustAdmins.length, "Metaverse: length is not match"); require(addrs.length > 0, "Metaverse: length is zero"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++) { core().createAccount_(addrs[i], addrs[i], isTrustAdmins[i]); } } ``` ```solidity=129 if (_isTrustAdmin) { require(_address == _sender, "Metaverse: Only AuthAddress can set trustAdmin to true"); } ```

MediumUsing Same Signature For Different OperationsOpen

In the new version of contract `MetaverseCore`([commit `d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3`](https://github.com/AcertChain/Acert-Contract-V2/blob/d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3/contracts/metaverse/MetaverseCore.sol)), the newly added function `unfreezeAccount()` uses the same signature as the functions that add auth accounts, like `addAccountAuthAddress()`, `addAuthAddress_()`, `addAuthAddressBWO_()`. This can cause confusion in the operation of the signatures. The admin can use the `AddAuth` signature for adding auth addresses to unfreeze the account.

LowMissing Error MessagesOpen

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller. ```solidity=28 modifier onlyWorld() { require(world == msg.sender); _; } ```

LowPotential Out-Of-Gas ExceptionOpen

The linked functions `createAccountBatch()`, `removeAllAuthAddress()`, and `trustWorldBatch()` are performing costly operations like accessing storage variables in a loop. EVM may revert this call and return the OUT_OF_GAS exception if the length of the processing list is too large.

LowUnlocked Compiler VersionOpen

The contracts in the protocol have an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

LowUser-Defined GettersOpen

The linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (7)

  • contracts/Acert.sol
  • contracts/metaverse/MetaverseCore.sol
  • contracts/world/World.sol
  • contracts/metaverse/MetaverseStorage.sol
  • contracts/metaverse/Metaverse.sol
  • contracts/world/WorldStorage.sol
  • contracts/world/WorldCore.sol

Part of Monster Galaxy’s security record

Monster Galaxy
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Apr 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Monster Galaxy’s security record

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CertiK

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