Monster Galaxy audit reports

Monster Galaxy has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 20 Apr 2023; no critical findings reported.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
In 1 report.
Open the latest report
Your label, live
Get the label for your site

Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm7

Statuses are the security firms’ own

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 4 low (all open).

High
2
Medium
1
Low
4
  • High Open

    `sender` Parameter In Function `trustWorldBatch()

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Wrong Argument Passing in Function `createAccount

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Using Same Signature For Different Operations

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Error Messages

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Out-Of-Gas Exception

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unlocked Compiler Version

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    User-Defined Getters

    Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Monster GalaxySecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 3 medium · 9 low
8 fixed · 7 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings15

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium102
Low405
High`sender` Parameter In Function `trustWorldBatch()Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

In the contract `World`, the function `trustWorldBatch()` gets the first address in the `MetaverseStorage.authAddress[id]` and uses the address as the sender argument to pass to the function `WorldCore.trustWorld_()`. This logic is a little confusing because it is different from the logic in the functions `trustWorld()` and `trustWorldBWO()` where the sender is `_msgSender()`. This also increments nonces for the wrong sender. In addition, the function `trustWorld_()` in the contract `WorldCore` is expecting the `_msgSender` as the first parameter.

Open the report
HighWrong Argument Passing in Function `createAccountMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

The function `createAccountBatch()` calls the function `core().createAccount_()` with wrong arguments. The first parameter should be `_msgSender()` instead of `addrs[i]`. This will cause the `require` condition in the second code snippet in the function `MetaverseCore._createAccount()` to always be met. It also increments nonces for the wrong sender. ```solidity=9 function createAccountBatch(address[] calldata addrs, bool[] calldata isTrustAdmins) public onlyOwner { require(addrs.length == isTrustAdmins.length, "Metaverse: length is not match"); require(addrs.length > 0, "Metaverse: length is zero"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++) { core().createAccount_(addrs[i], addrs[i], isTrustAdmins[i]); } } ``` ```solidity=129 if (_isTrustAdmin) { require(_address == _sender, "Metaverse: Only AuthAddress can set trustAdmin to true"); } ```

Open the report
MediumUsing Same Signature For Different OperationsMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

In the new version of contract `MetaverseCore`([commit `d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3`](https://github.com/AcertChain/Acert-Contract-V2/blob/d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3/contracts/metaverse/MetaverseCore.sol)), the newly added function `unfreezeAccount()` uses the same signature as the functions that add auth accounts, like `addAccountAuthAddress()`, `addAuthAddress_()`, `addAuthAddressBWO_()`. This can cause confusion in the operation of the signatures. The admin can use the `AddAuth` signature for adding auth addresses to unfreeze the account.

Open the report
LowMissing Error MessagesMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller. ```solidity=28 modifier onlyWorld() { require(world == msg.sender); _; } ```

Open the report
LowPotential Out-Of-Gas ExceptionMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

The linked functions `createAccountBatch()`, `removeAllAuthAddress()`, and `trustWorldBatch()` are performing costly operations like accessing storage variables in a loop. EVM may revert this call and return the OUT_OF_GAS exception if the length of the processing list is too large.

Open the report
LowUnlocked Compiler VersionMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

The contracts in the protocol have an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Open the report
LowUser-Defined GettersMonster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023Open

The linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.

Open the report

Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.

The repositories and files the reports name

Monster Galaxy: questions

Is Monster Galaxy audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Monster Galaxy, dated 20 Apr 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Monster Galaxy”).

Who audited Monster Galaxy?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Monster Galaxy.

Are there open findings in Monster Galaxy’s audits?

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 4 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

Show this on your site

Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.

Content

Facts

Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.

Fixed as
Language

Style

Layout
Theme
Accent
Corners

Format

Size
Date
Embed as
HTML
<head>
<script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script>
</head>
<body>
<div
data-tb-project-widget
data-tb-project-slug="monster-galaxy"
></div>
</body>

Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us