Monster Galaxy has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 20 Apr 2023; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 4 low (all open).
`sender` Parameter In Function `trustWorldBatch()
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Wrong Argument Passing in Function `createAccount
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Using Same Signature For Different Operations
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Error Messages
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Out-Of-Gas Exception
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Unlocked Compiler Version
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
User-Defined Getters
Monster Galaxy · CertiK · 20 Apr 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monster Galaxy | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 3 high · 3 medium · 9 low 8 fixed · 7 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 4 | 0 | 5 |
In the contract `World`, the function `trustWorldBatch()` gets the first address in the `MetaverseStorage.authAddress[id]` and uses the address as the sender argument to pass to the function `WorldCore.trustWorld_()`. This logic is a little confusing because it is different from the logic in the functions `trustWorld()` and `trustWorldBWO()` where the sender is `_msgSender()`. This also increments nonces for the wrong sender. In addition, the function `trustWorld_()` in the contract `WorldCore` is expecting the `_msgSender` as the first parameter.
Open the reportThe function `createAccountBatch()` calls the function `core().createAccount_()` with wrong arguments. The first parameter should be `_msgSender()` instead of `addrs[i]`. This will cause the `require` condition in the second code snippet in the function `MetaverseCore._createAccount()` to always be met. It also increments nonces for the wrong sender. ```solidity=9 function createAccountBatch(address[] calldata addrs, bool[] calldata isTrustAdmins) public onlyOwner { require(addrs.length == isTrustAdmins.length, "Metaverse: length is not match"); require(addrs.length > 0, "Metaverse: length is zero"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++) { core().createAccount_(addrs[i], addrs[i], isTrustAdmins[i]); } } ``` ```solidity=129 if (_isTrustAdmin) { require(_address == _sender, "Metaverse: Only AuthAddress can set trustAdmin to true"); } ```
Open the reportIn the new version of contract `MetaverseCore`([commit `d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3`](https://github.com/AcertChain/Acert-Contract-V2/blob/d1e5fb67db901378b5c13c662419bc17eb6906a3/contracts/metaverse/MetaverseCore.sol)), the newly added function `unfreezeAccount()` uses the same signature as the functions that add auth accounts, like `addAccountAuthAddress()`, `addAuthAddress_()`, `addAuthAddressBWO_()`. This can cause confusion in the operation of the signatures. The admin can use the `AddAuth` signature for adding auth addresses to unfreeze the account.
Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller. ```solidity=28 modifier onlyWorld() { require(world == msg.sender); _; } ```
Open the reportThe linked functions `createAccountBatch()`, `removeAllAuthAddress()`, and `trustWorldBatch()` are performing costly operations like accessing storage variables in a loop. EVM may revert this call and return the OUT_OF_GAS exception if the length of the processing list is too large.
Open the reportThe contracts in the protocol have an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
Open the reportThe linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Monster Galaxy, dated 20 Apr 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Monster Galaxy”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Monster Galaxy.
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 4 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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