CertiK reviewed Biswap on 9 Jun 2021: 10 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 0 |
The total amount of reward BSWReward in function `updatePool()` will be incorrectly calculated if the same LP token is added into the pool more than once in function `add()`. However, the code is not reflected in the comment behaviors as there isn’t any valid restriction on preventing this issue. The current implementation relies on the owner's trust to avoid repeatedly adding the same LP token to the pool, as the function will only be called by the owner.
The voting power of delegation is not moved from token sender to token recipient along with the `transfer()`. Current `transfer()` is from `BEP20` protocol and don't invoke `_moveDelegates()`.
`setMigrator()` function can set migrator contract to any contract that is implemented from `IMigratorChef` interface by the owner. As result, invocation of `migrator.migrate()` in function migrate() may bring dangerous effects as it is unknown to the user. However, the project may lose the ability to upgrade and migrate if `setMigrator()` and `migrate()` are removed.
The function that affects the status of sensitive variables should be able to emit events as notifications to customers. - `dev()` - `setMigrator()` - `updateBswPerBlock()`
BSWToken is the standard BEP20 implementation that contains the mint functionality with ownership controls, which means whoever obtained access to the minter account would be able to tamper with the integrity of the token economics.
The owner of MasterChef has permission to add and set pools that could update the parameters on rewards without obtaining the consensus of the community.
There's no sanity check to validate if a pool is existing.
Role of onlyMinter() is not set correctly, no initial Minter was set.
Third party function ISwapFeeReward(swapFeeReward).swap(msg.sender, input, output, amountOut) was called in _swap(). The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with third party functions. The scope of the audit would treat those 3rd party entities as black boxes and assume its functional correctness. However in the real world, 3rd parties may be compromised that led to assets lost or stolen.
_devFee was defined as "uint32" in function setDevFee(uint32 _devFee), while "uint8" in BiswapFactory.sol: function setDevFee(address _pair, uint8 _devFee) external
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