Teku

QuantstampRepository at commit 1069ade

Quantstamp reviewed Teku on 29 Sep 2020: 29 findings, 0 critical; 20 marked fixed, 8 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings29

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium125
Low0614
MediumDDoS Attack Vector Through A Mapping Between Public Keys and Validators’ IPsOpen

It is possible to DDoS the system by attacking block proposers and/or committee members. Such an attack would rely on a mapping between validators’ public keys and their IP addresses. Furthermore, one can detect the roles of a validator with a certain public key based on the tables of validator indices. Once an attacker has the mapping of public keys and IPs, the attacker can target them based on their roles. The more complete the mapping is, the higher is the possibility for an attacker to DDoS the system from proposing new blocks. There’s no need, however, for this mapping to be complete in order to harm the system. When an attacker learns the IP of a validator, the attacker could have the validator slashed by DDoSing the validator when it plays a role of a committee member. Following previous audit reports on the Eth2 specification, it has been reported that an attacker can link IP addresses with block proposers, giving him the ability to DoS a proposer of a slot to stall the chain, or to keep slots empty. For further information, please refer to: - [https://medium.com/prysmatic-labs/quantstamp-security-audit-results-for-the-prysm-eth2-client-7f949c6c866f](https://medium.com/prysmatic-labs/quantstamp-security-audit-results-for-the-prysm-eth2-client-7f949c6c866f) - [https://leastauthority.com/static/publications/LeastAuthority-Ethereum-2.0-Specifications-Audit-Report.pdf](https://leastauthority.com/static/publications/LeastAuthority-Ethereum-2.0-Specifications-Audit-Report.pdf)

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (4)

  • https://github.com/Consensys/signers/signing/secp256k1/impl/src/main/java/tech/pegasys/signers/secp256k1/azure/AzureKeyVaultSigner.java at commit 1069adefa4e1c93e7a486810cbd0dba67214745b
  • https://github.com/Consensys/discovery/src/main/java/org/ethereum/beacon/discovery/message/handler/ExternalAddressSelector.java at commit 840e90bea80699790eb750839be7402fe8b598b0
  • https://github.com/libp2p/jvm-libp2p/README.md at commit 3fd9dd92659fdfa0cb5d8be4aaa051c25a34785d
  • https://github.com/Consensys/teku/gradle.properties at commit a3f6ed9aa646a43bc04d43b22cf98ed24e5dde71

Part of Teku’s security record

Teku
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2020, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Teku’s security record

Security firm

Quantstamp

236 projects reviewed · 332 reports · latest Oct 2026

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