Teku security record

It is possible to DDoS the system by attacking block proposers and/or committee members. Such an attack would rely on a mapping between validators’ public keys and their IP addresses. Furthermore, one can detect the roles of a validator with a certain public key based on the tables of validator indices. Once an attacker has the mapping of public keys and IPs, the attacker can target them based on their roles. The more complete the mapping is, the higher is the possibility for an attacker to DDoS the system from proposing new blocks. There’s no need, however, for this mapping to be complete in order to harm the system. When an attacker learns the IP of a validator, the attacker could have the validator slashed by DDoSing the validator when it plays a role of a committee member. Following previous audit reports on the Eth2 specification, it has been reported that an attacker can link IP addresses with block proposers, giving him the ability to DoS a proposer of a slot to stall the chain, or to keep slots empty. For further information, please refer to: - [https://medium.com/prysmatic-labs/quantstamp-security-audit-results-for-the-prysm-eth2-client-7f949c6c866f](https://medium.com/prysmatic-labs/quantstamp-security-audit-results-for-the-prysm-eth2-client-7f949c6c866f) - [https://leastauthority.com/static/publications/LeastAuthority-Ethereum-2.0-Specifications-Audit-Report.pdf](https://leastauthority.com/static/publications/LeastAuthority-Ethereum-2.0-Specifications-Audit-Report.pdf)