Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2)

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed PLAYA3ULL GAMES (Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2)) on 24 May 2023: 46 findings, 3 critical; 42 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 2 open.

3 critical findings, fixed
Open the reportOpen PLAYA3ULL GAMES’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings46

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical003
High022
Medium003
Low2034
LowPossible Denial Of Service SituationOpen

The following contracts implemented native token transfers that In the `marketplaceCore.sol`, users can call `acceptOffer()` to accept an offer or `fulfillListing()` to fulfill a listing, which involves in native token transfers. For example, in the `_handleRoyalties()`: ```solidity=473 function _handleRoyalties(IERC721 token, uint256 tokenId, uint256 consideration) internal returns (uint256, uint256) { uint256 marketFee; uint256 creatorFee; // Transfer royalties to marketplace royalty receiver if(royaltyReceiver != address(0)) { marketFee = consideration * royaltyFee.numerator / royaltyFee.denominator; payable(royaltyReceiver).transfer(marketFee); } // Transfer royalties to NFT creator, if the creator has implemented // the ERC2981 NFT Royalty Standard if(checkRoyalties(address(token))) { (address creator, uint256 fee) = IERC2981(address(token)).royaltyInfo(tokenId, consideration); creatorFee = fee; payable(creator).transfer(creatorFee); } return (marketFee, creatorFee); } ``` However, if the recipient implements a fallback that **revert automatically** like this: ```solidity fallback() external payable { revert("fallback"); } ``` This can create stuck orders inside the marketplace contract as the buyer won't be able to complete the transaction (during the transfer of native token to the seller). This issue can also arise with ERC721 through the `onERC721Received()` callback that will lead to the same behavior.

LowSeed Owner Control WeaknessOpen

Files: - `playa3ull-contracts/contracts/lottery/Lottery.sol` Commit: - [`52b2cf6d01d70ca15948dc3bb19464ed097e33f1`](https://github.com/playa3ull/playa3ull-contracts/tree/52b2cf6d01d70ca15948dc3bb19464ed097e33f1/contracts) The `drawWinner()` function selects a valid ticket randomly to determine the winner. \ However, it's crucial to note that the contract owner controls the seed parameter. \ This allows the owner to compute the result beforehand for a specific seed, which could grant certain addresses an unfair advantage.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (36)

  • contracts/avalanche/interfaces/INativeMinter.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/lib/MathUtils.sol
  • contracts/contracts/native/NativeRequestHandler.sol
  • contracts/contracts/foreign/ForeignRequestHandler.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/interfaces/I3ULLNFT.sol
  • contracts/avalanche/interfaces/IAllowList.sol
  • contracts/lottery/Lottery.sol
  • contracts/core/SupplyController.sol
  • contracts/lottery/interfaces/ILotteryEventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/core/interfaces/INodeEventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/contracts/interfaces/IRequestHandler.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/interfaces/I3ULLNFTMinterEventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/contracts/WrappedToken.sol
  • contracts/w3ULL.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/BULLNFTMinter.sol
  • contracts/core/NativeNodePurchaser.sol
  • contracts/contracts/foreign/ForeignBridge.sol
  • contracts/nft/vi3/interfaces/IVI3EventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/contracts/native/NativeBridge.sol
  • contracts/core/Node.sol
  • contracts/contracts/BaseRequestHandler.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/MarketplaceCore.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplace.sol
  • contracts/avalanche/AllowList.sol
  • contracts/lottery/interfaces/ILotteryVaultEventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/core/interfaces/INode.sol
  • contracts/core/ProtocolSupply.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/BULLNFTStorage.sol
  • contracts/contracts/interfaces/IBridge.sol
  • contracts/nft/vi3/VI3.sol
  • contracts/contracts/BridgeBase.sol
  • contracts/marketplace/interfaces/IMarketplaceEventsAndErrors.sol
  • contracts/lottery/interfaces/ILottery.sol
  • contracts/lottery/LotteryVault.sol
  • contracts/contracts/interfaces/IToken.sol
  • contracts/nft/bull/interfaces/I3ULLNFTEventsAndErrors.sol

Part of PLAYA3ULL GAMES’s security record

PLAYA3ULL GAMES
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit May 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn that report, 3 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open PLAYA3ULL GAMES’s security record

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