PLAYA3ULL GAMES audit reports

PLAYA3ULL GAMES has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 24 May 2023; 3 critical findings, all marked fixed by the firms.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
In that report, 3 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm4

Statuses are the security firms’ own

4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 low (2 open, 2 acknowledged).

High
2
Low
2
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks in Bridge Module

    Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks in Contracts Module

    Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Possible Denial Of Service Situation

    Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Seed Owner Control Weakness

    Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2)Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed3 critical findings, fixedFindings: 3 critical · 4 high · 3 medium · 36 low
42 fixed · 2 acknowledged · 2 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings46

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical003
High022
Medium003
Low2034
LowPossible Denial Of Service SituationPlaya3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023Open

The following contracts implemented native token transfers that In the `marketplaceCore.sol`, users can call `acceptOffer()` to accept an offer or `fulfillListing()` to fulfill a listing, which involves in native token transfers. For example, in the `_handleRoyalties()`: ```solidity=473 function _handleRoyalties(IERC721 token, uint256 tokenId, uint256 consideration) internal returns (uint256, uint256) { uint256 marketFee; uint256 creatorFee; // Transfer royalties to marketplace royalty receiver if(royaltyReceiver != address(0)) { marketFee = consideration * royaltyFee.numerator / royaltyFee.denominator; payable(royaltyReceiver).transfer(marketFee); } // Transfer royalties to NFT creator, if the creator has implemented // the ERC2981 NFT Royalty Standard if(checkRoyalties(address(token))) { (address creator, uint256 fee) = IERC2981(address(token)).royaltyInfo(tokenId, consideration); creatorFee = fee; payable(creator).transfer(creatorFee); } return (marketFee, creatorFee); } ``` However, if the recipient implements a fallback that **revert automatically** like this: ```solidity fallback() external payable { revert("fallback"); } ``` This can create stuck orders inside the marketplace contract as the buyer won't be able to complete the transaction (during the transfer of native token to the seller). This issue can also arise with ERC721 through the `onERC721Received()` callback that will lead to the same behavior.

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LowSeed Owner Control WeaknessPlaya3Ull Games (Audit 2) · CertiK · 24 May 2023Open

Files: - `playa3ull-contracts/contracts/lottery/Lottery.sol` Commit: - [`52b2cf6d01d70ca15948dc3bb19464ed097e33f1`](https://github.com/playa3ull/playa3ull-contracts/tree/52b2cf6d01d70ca15948dc3bb19464ed097e33f1/contracts) The `drawWinner()` function selects a valid ticket randomly to determine the winner. \ However, it's crucial to note that the contract owner controls the seed parameter. \ This allows the owner to compute the result beforehand for a specific seed, which could grant certain addresses an unfair advantage.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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PLAYA3ULL GAMES: questions

Is PLAYA3ULL GAMES audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for PLAYA3ULL GAMES, dated 24 May 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Playa3Ull Games (Audit 2)”).

Who audited PLAYA3ULL GAMES?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for PLAYA3ULL GAMES.

Are there open findings in PLAYA3ULL GAMES’s audits?

4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 low (2 open, 2 acknowledged). Of 3 critical findings: all marked fixed by the firms. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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