1inch Network security record

As of 19 Nov 2026, 1inch Network has 53 audit reports by 13 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Hexens, dated 2 Jul 2026. Those reports list 2 criticals acknowledged and not fixed. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain and 1 incident (latest 6 Mar 2025).

Critical findings
2 criticals acknowledged, not fixed
Reported in “1inch Liquidity Protocol” by Consensys, Dec 2020. The team acknowledged both. See the findings
Incident
Incident 6 Mar 2025
Source: De.Fi incident database. 7 audits have been published since. See the incident
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits53

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
1inch security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch SwapVM&Aqua AuditSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Crosschain security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Crosschain security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the report1 critical finding, fixedGitHub ↗
1inch Crosschain security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch FusionSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
1inch Sol security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the report1 critical finding, fixedGitHub ↗
Cross Chain Swaps AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Cross-Chain Swaps V2Security firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Settlement Refactor AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Limit Order and Aggregation Protocols Diff ASecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Limit Order Protocol Diff AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Aggregation Protocol Diff AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Limit Order Settlement AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
1inch Fusion V2 auditSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Cross Chain Swaps auditSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inchSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch SettlementExtensionSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch security reviewSecurity firm: HexensDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Aggregation Router v6 & Limit Order v4Security firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Limit Order Settlement Phase II auditSecurity firm: ABDK ConsultingDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Calldata CompressorSecurity firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Aggregation Protocol v6Security firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
1inch Fusion v2Security firm: DecurityDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗

Findings583

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical028
High11926
Medium113849
Low45139159
HighUnauthorized withdrawalOpen

The report gives no description here.

Medium[M01] Static arguments passed after dynamic argumentsOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumInexistent Input SanitizationOpen

The `src` and `dst` arguments of the `swapFor` function are not guaranteed to be equal to the supported tokens of the exchange. While `_doTransfers` will simply yield 0 for the `confirmed` variable on unsupported tokens, this can lead to incorrect reward minting on `_mintRewards` as the confirmed balance is simply utilized during reward calculation

MediumInvalidating users ordersOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumMooniswap pairs cannot be unpausedOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumPausable contract not externally unpausableOpen

The `_unpause` function in the `Pausable` contract is not exposed, meaning that an accidental invocation of the `pause` function is irreversible.

MediumPotential token decimals mismatchOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumUnhandled division by zero - Zero and negative inputAmount is not handled before math operations.Open

The report gives no description here.

MediumUnpredictable behavior for users due to admin front running or general bad timingOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumUntitled findingOpen

The report gives no description here.

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MediumUntitled findingOpen

The report gives no description here.

MediumUsers can “increase” their voting power by voting for the max/min valuesOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowLow Granularity of Voting Threshold1inch Limit Order Settlement Audit · OpenZeppelin · 20 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
LowLimited calldata decompression tests1inch Calldata Compressor · Decurity · 19 May 2023Open

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
Low[L01] Transfer may failOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L02] Malicious parties could prevent the execution of permitable ordersOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L03] Duplicated codeOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L03] Lack of input validationOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L05] Errors and omissions in eventsOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L06] No accessible coverage reportOpen

The report gives no description here.

Show 10 more
Low[L09] Low unit test coverageOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L10] Misleading or incomplete inline documentationOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L11] DoS orders possible when using hooksOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low[L12] Rounding can be unfavorable for takerOpen

The report gives no description here.

Low`require` to `modifier`Open

The linked `require` statements could instead be coded in a small `internal` or `private` function that is invoked by a corresponding `modifier` to reduce the gas footprint of the contract.

LowAssembly-based OptimizationOpen

The linked code block creates a new in-memory `bytes` array and assigns each byte sequentially to it via a loop from the `data` array

LowBabylonian Method OptimizationOpen

The linked Babylonian Square Root implementation can be further optimized by omitting the final `else` block as Solidity returns zeroed out values by default regardless of whether the return variable has been explicitly named or not. Additionally, we highly advise that the new, more optimized Babylonian Method from ABDK Consulting is evaluated as an optimized alternative which has already been integrated in Uniswap.

LowCode duplicityOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowConsider using specific contract types in event declarations instead of address ✓ Fix UnverifiedOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowConsistency on Zero Amount TransfersOpen

The report gives no description here.

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LowContract owner can only rescue funds for themselfOpen

The `rescueFunds` function allows the owner of the contract to transfer an arbitrary amount from an arbitrary IERC20 token to themself in order to retrieve funds accidentally sent to it: ```solidity function rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { token.uniTransfer(msg.sender, amount); } ```

LowDiscounted swap can be performed while pausedOpen

The discountedSwap function in the OneInchExchange contract does not incorporate the whenNotPaused modifier as the swap function does.

LowEarly withdraw can revertOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowFee Collectors can not be removedOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowFunction Visibility OptimizationOpen

The linked functions are declared as `external` or `public`, contain array function arguments and are meant to be mostly invoked by external parties.

LowGovernanceMothership - Follow checks-effects-interactionsOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowImprove inline documentation and test coverageOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowLack of EventsOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowLoop OptimizationOpen

The linked code block contains four `for` loops to ultimately conduct all operations necessary on the 2-member `maxAmounts` and `realBalances` arrays.

LowMidway Condition EvaluationOpen

The linked `require` statements ensure that the `maxAmounts` provided to the contract at the start are greater-than ( `>` ) zero, yet they are evaluated mid-way through.

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LowNo DocumentationOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowNon-optimal flags storage typeOpen

The `flags` variable could be reduced in size to be tight-packed with the address declaration that follows it by setting its size to `uint96` permitting 96 different flags. This would reduce the total storage cost of the `SwapDescription` to 7 from 8 if we do not factor in the `permit` variable.

LowNotes and considerations about the Governance DesignOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowOrder book slippageOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowOrder cancellation event spam in orderMixinOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowRedundant Function ImplementationOpen

The function `_toHex` is implemented twice utilizing function overloading, however the middleware implementation accepting an `address` argument is only used once.

LowRedundant NestingOpen

The `vote` library is meant to be utilized on Data structs that contain only a single `uint256` value.

LowSWC-103 Floating pragmaOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowThe owner can borrow token0/token1 in the rescueFundsOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowUnlocked Solidity compiler versionsOpen

An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Show 7 more
LowUnnecessary `else` statement in `uniBalanceOf` imOpen

The `uniBalanceOf` function can skip the `else`-block implementation and directly return the specific value after the `if`-condition is not me

LowUnspecific compiler version pragmaOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowUntitled findingOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowUnused ContractsOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowUsage of if-revert pattern over requireOpen

The `swap` function in the `OneInchExchange` contract contains the usage of the if-revert pattern over using a require clause, which may be deprecated in the future: ```solidity if (!desc.flags.isDiscountChi()) { revert(RevertReasonParser.parse(reason, "Swap failed: ")); } ```

LowUse of hardcoded gas limits can be problematicOpen

The report gives no description here.

LowVote - Integer Overflow can be used to force the internal default stateOpen

The report gives no description here.

Incidents1

Attached through a shared contract address. Our incident data ends in Nov 2026.

Incident

Incident,

Source: De.Fi incident database.

Audits before it
46.
Audits since
7, the latest dated 2 Jul 2026.

Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x111111111117dc0aa78b770fa6a738034120c302Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

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