Solv Protocol security record

As of 19 Nov 2026, Solv Protocol has 6 audit reports by 3 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 15 Dec 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 1 chain.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across 6 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits6

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Solv Protocol - BTC RedemptionSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Audit Report (SolvBTC)Security firm: PaladinDate: Scope: 2 addresses on EthereumNone openIPFS ↗
Solv Protocol - SolvBTCSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Repository at commit eafc741None opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Solv Yield - Bearing TokensSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗
Solv Protocol- Vault GuardianSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Repository at commit 80300acNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Solv Protocol stUSD - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗

Findings55

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High2140
Medium1032
Low411150
HighCentralization Related RisksSolv Protocol stUSD - Audit · CertiK · 28 Dec 2023Open

In the contract `GovernorControl` the role `governor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `governor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the pending governor's address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_GovernorControl-GovernorControl-_governor.svg) In the contract `GovernorControl` the role `pendinggovernor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pendinggovernor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the governor's address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_GovernorControl-GovernorControl-_pendinggovernor.svg) ----- In the contract `AdminControl` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the pending admin's address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_AdminControl-AdminControl-admin.svg) In the contract `AdminControl` the role `pendingAdmin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pendingAdmin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the admin's address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_AdminControl-AdminControl-pendingAdmin.svg) ----- In the contract `SftWrappedTokenFactory` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set the implementation address - deploy the Beacon proxy - upgrade the implementation of the Beacon proxy - transfer the ownership of the Beacon proxy to the new owner ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_SftWrappedTokenFactory-SftWrappedTokenFactory-_admin.svg) In the contract `SftWrappedTokenFactory` the role `governor` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `governor` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and deploy/remove product proxy. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-9aee-70b1ab90-b950-e79a2e4d9381/diagrams/centralization_SftWrappedTokenFactory-SftWrappedTokenFactory-_governor.svg)

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeSolv Protocol stUSD - Audit · CertiK · 28 Dec 2023Open

In the contract `SftWrappedToken`, the role `admin` of the proxy has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the proxy contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

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MediumThird-Party Dependency UsageSolv Protocol stUSD - Audit · CertiK · 28 Dec 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=43 address public wrappedSftAddress; ``` - The contract `SftWrappedToken` interacts with third party contract with `IERC3525` interface via `wrappedSftAddress`. --- ```solidity=45 address public navOracle; ``` - The contract `SftWrappedToken` interacts with third party contract with `INavOracle` interface via `navOracle`.

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LowTypographical issuesAudit Report (SolvBTC) · Paladin · 9 Dec 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowOut-of-Scope DependenciesSolv Yield - Bearing Tokens · CertiK · 8 Apr 2024Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with the out-of-scope contracts `IOpenFundMarket` and deposit tokens to the `IOpenFundMarket`. The scope of the audit treats these entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, external dependencies and out-of-scope contracts can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets.

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LowUnused InheritancesSolv Yield - Bearing Tokens · CertiK · 8 Apr 2024Open

The `SftWrapRouter` inherits `AdminControlUpgradeable` and `GovernorControlUpgradeable`, which are initiated but never used. This could potentially lead to confusion and inefficiency in contract deployment and interaction.

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LowThe Design of the contract `SftWrappedToken`Solv Protocol stUSD - Audit · CertiK · 28 Dec 2023Open

When a user calls `mint()` and the passed amount equals the balance of `sftId_`, the ownership of `sftId_` transfers to the contract. The initial assignment is to `holdingValueSftId`, and the remainder is inserted into `_holdingEmptySftIds`. Subsequently, when a user calls `burn()`, and if `_holdingEmptySftIds` is empty, a new ID regenerates, and ownership remains with the current user. No ownership of `holdingValueSftId` is reclaimed. However, if `_holdingEmptySftIds` is not empty, the last ID is taken and removed. This results in the ownership of the contract transferring to the user. Nevertheless, the number of contracts may not match those initially transferred. Consequently, there will be a discrepancy in the token IDs between the `burn()` and `mint()` operations. Different ERC-3225 token IDs may exhibit varying value differences, potentially leading to losses.

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Contracts2

AddressChainSource code
0x2265a8e449ea5ff78ee4c115370e9b5957358a68Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source
0xb12979ff302ac903849948037a51792cf7186e8eChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

All 2 addresses and the files the reports name

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