0x1e8af416823b1911c6b640a10b817b47f962d56a
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x1e8af416823b1911c6b640a10b817b47f962d56a on BNB Chain as a contract of BenTen Inu. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 5 Jun 2023. 12 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benten Inu - Audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 2 Medium, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All **BENT** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute **BENT** tokens without the consensus of the community. *Note: The holder list can be found on the [BSC Chain](https://bscscan.com/token/0x1e8af416823b1911c6b640a10b817b47f962d56a#balances).*
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report```solidity function swapAndLiquify() private lockTheSwap { uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this)); swapTokensForBNB(contractBalance); uint256 deltaBalance = address(this).balance; if (deltaBalance > 0) { payable(marketingWallet).sendValue(deltaBalance); } } ``` The `swapAndLiquify()` function executes the `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` function to convert `BENT` tokens into `BNB` and transfers the `BNB` to the designated `marketingWallet` address. Consequently, the `marketingWallet` address gradually accumulates a substantial amount of `BNB`. If the `marketingWallet` is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), the mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences for the project as a whole. For the common deflationary token, the entire tokenomics model requires a certain level of liquidity to support. However, the current implementation transfers the swapped `BNB` to the `marketingWallet` without utilizing it for liquidity provisions. There are also no mechanisms within the contract to inject liquidity into the main pair liquidity pool when required. Consequently, the token may face the risks related to price instability and manipulation due to inadequate liquidity in the BENT-WBNB pool, thus leading to a potential price drop.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAccording to the following code snippet: ```solidity function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner { require(_isExcluded[account], "Account is not excluded"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } } ``` Variable `_rOwned[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders. The Rate was higher at the moment of the `excludeFromReward(account)` call, so the `_rOwned[account] / _tOwned[account]` ratio is bigger than expected for accounts included in the reward.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportConsidering the code snippet provided: ```solidity=530 function changeFee(Taxes memory _taxes) public onlyOwner { require((_taxes.rfi + _taxes.marketing) <= 15, "Tax must lower than 15%"); taxes = _taxes; } ``` It is worth noting that the `_taxes.rfi` and `_taxes.marketing` values can be modified arbitrarily, as long as the condition `(_taxes.rfi + _taxes.marketing) <= 15` is satisfied. However, if the `_taxes.rfi` value is set to 0, the reflection mechanism becomes ineffective, rendering the token no longer deflationary. Consequently, users would still incur transaction fees while other holders would no longer benefit from holding tokens.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn function `transferFrom()`, the `_transfer()` function is executed before checks and updates to the allowance are processed. ```solidity=230 function transferFrom( address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount ) public override returns (bool) { _transfer(sender, recipient, amount); uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[sender][_msgSender()]; require(currentAllowance >= amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"); _approve(sender, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount); return true; } ``` This violates the check-effect-interaction pattern and should follow the checks and updates of the allowances. An added benefit is that having the allowance check `require(currentAllowance >= amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance")` before the execution of the `_transfer()` function (or any checks in general before such external function calls) will save gas since all remaining gas will be returned after the function reverts immediately due to insufficient gas.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe function `changeMarketingWallet()` is used to update the `marketingWallet` address. ```solidity=553 function changeMarketingWallet(address _marketWallet) public onlyOwner { marketingWallet = _marketWallet; } ``` The original `marketingWallet` was excluded from fees, however, there is no mechanism to remove the old `marketingWallet` from the `_isExcludedFromFee` mapping and add the new `marketingWallet` to the `_isExcludedFromFee` mapping. The audit team would like to understand how this wallet update process is handled and recommend implementing the update automatically in the function run.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAddresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=536 marketingWallet = _marketWallet; ``` - `_marketWallet` is not zero-checked before being used.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following function is called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()`
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=139 uint256 private _tTotal = 420000000000000000 * 10**_decimals; ``` - `_tTotal` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=144 address public deadWallet = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD; ``` - `deadWallet` should be declared `constant`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract cited has an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
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