0x2024b9be6b03f2a57d3533ae33c7e1d0b0b4be47
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x2024b9be6b03f2a57d3533ae33c7e1d0b0b4be47 on BNB Chain as a contract of Bitcointry. 2 audit reports on Trustblock list this address, from CertiK and Cyberscope; the newest is CertiK, 21 May 2024. 11 findings in them are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BTTY token audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open | |
| Bitcointry Token | Cyberscope | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
2 High, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `Bitcointry_Token` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set fees via `stakingFeesSetup()` up to 25% each (buy, sell, transfer) - mark more addresses as AMM via `setAMMPair()` making more operations treated as buy/sell - `excludeFromFees()` more addresses allowing them to transfer tokens without fees - change `stakingAddress` via `stakingAddressSetup()`, it gets the fees - extract other tokens locked in the contract via `recoverERC20()` 
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAll of the BTTY tokens are sent to the contract deployer. At the moment of the audit, the tokens are distributed this way: - 26% at Bitcointry Hot Wallet - 11% at Bitcointry Token Deployer - 10% at Bitcointry Team Wallet - 9% at PancakeSwap pair - the rest is distributed among other ~1000 EoA token holders Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract allows the `owner` to `initialize()` and set `routerV2`/`pairV2` values. However, the function will fail if `Pair(address(this), routerV2.WETH()` already exists. That is the only way to set `routerV2` value.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract has a `receive()` function or payable functions, making it able to receive native tokens. However, it does not have a function to withdraw the funds, which can lead to permanently locked tokens within the contract. ```solidity=65 receive() external payable {} ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportState variable `_swapping` is never set and thus the check `if (!_swapping...` in `_transfer()` is redundant. --- ```sol=161 if (isPair) { } ``` The code in `_setAMMPair()` seems to be leftover. --- `totalFees` always consists of `stakingFees` only. So, transferring the non-`stakingPortion` of fees is redundant: ```sol=134 if (fees > 0) { super._transfer(from, address(this), fees); } ``` Also, the tokens transferred this way to the contract address can't be extracted. There is no need to exclude the contract address from fees: ```sol=55 excludeFromFees(address(this), true); ``` The `totalFees` state field can be eliminated. --- ```sol=65 receive() external payable {} ``` The contract is not supposed to receive native tokens, the `receive()` function is redundant.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Bitcointry security record · Every Bitcointry address · This address on the explorer