Tusima Network contract 0x2bd2…e0c0 on BNB Chain

0x2bd236ad144753bd5839d82c46ee2c2225b9e0c0

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x2bd236ad144753bd5839d82c46ee2c2225b9e0c0 on BNB Chain as a contract of Tusima Network. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 10 Dec 2024. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Tusima TokenCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksTusima Token · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer ownership to a new owner or renounce the ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-b3d8-587ab7c0-a051-2baf21b2743e/diagrams/centralization_TusimaToken-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `TusimaToken`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. **Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint new tokens to the owner's account or burn a specified amount from the sender's balance.** ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-b3d8-587ab7c0-a051-2baf21b2743e/diagrams/centralization_TusimaToken-TusimaToken-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInconsistent Unit Handling Between `mint` and `buTusima Token · CertiKAcknowledged

The `TusimaToken` contract has inconsistent unit handling between the `mint` and `burn` functions. In the `mint` function, the `amount_` parameter is multiplied by `1e18` before minting tokens: ```solidity function mint(uint256 amount_) external onlyOwner { require(totalSupply() + amount_ * 1e18 <= 10_000_000_000 * 1e18, "ERC20: amount limit"); _mint(msg.sender, amount_ * 1e18); } ``` However, in the `burn` function, the `amount_` parameter is used directly without adjustment: ```solidity function burn(uint256 amount_) external onlyOwner { _burn(msg.sender, amount_); } ``` This inconsistency results in a situation where burning tokens reduces the `totalSupply` by a negligible amount compared to the tokens minted. Specifically, when the owner burns tokens, the `amount_` is not multiplied by `1e18`. If the owner attempts to burn a quantity of `Tusima` tokens that is not an integer multiple of `1e18` (e.g., `0.5 * 1e18`), they will be unable to mint `0.5 * 1e18` tokens later to keep the total supply capped at 10 billion. Over time, this design could lead to a gradual decrease in the total token supply.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FTusima Token · CertiKAcknowledged

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Tusima Network security record · Every Tusima Network address · This address on the explorer