0x2bd236ad144753bd5839d82c46ee2c2225b9e0c0
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x2bd236ad144753bd5839d82c46ee2c2225b9e0c0 on BNB Chain as a contract of Tusima Network. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 10 Dec 2024. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tusima Token | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `Ownable`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer ownership to a new owner or renounce the ownership.  In the contract `TusimaToken`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. **Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint new tokens to the owner's account or burn a specified amount from the sender's balance.** 
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe `TusimaToken` contract has inconsistent unit handling between the `mint` and `burn` functions. In the `mint` function, the `amount_` parameter is multiplied by `1e18` before minting tokens: ```solidity function mint(uint256 amount_) external onlyOwner { require(totalSupply() + amount_ * 1e18 <= 10_000_000_000 * 1e18, "ERC20: amount limit"); _mint(msg.sender, amount_ * 1e18); } ``` However, in the `burn` function, the `amount_` parameter is used directly without adjustment: ```solidity function burn(uint256 amount_) external onlyOwner { _burn(msg.sender, amount_); } ``` This inconsistency results in a situation where burning tokens reduces the `totalSupply` by a negligible amount compared to the tokens minted. Specifically, when the owner burns tokens, the `amount_` is not multiplied by `1e18`. If the owner attempts to burn a quantity of `Tusima` tokens that is not an integer multiple of `1e18` (e.g., `0.5 * 1e18`), they will be unable to mint `0.5 * 1e18` tokens later to keep the total supply capped at 10 billion. Over time, this design could lead to a gradual decrease in the total token supply.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Tusima Network security record · Every Tusima Network address · This address on the explorer