Fortuneum contract 0x2d71…14fe on BNB Chain

0x2d716831d82d837c3922ad8c10fe70757b5814fe

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x2d716831d82d837c3922ad8c10fe70757b5814fe on BNB Chain as a contract of Fortuneum. 2 audit reports on Trustblock list this address, from CertiK; the newest is CertiK, 18 Nov 2022. 26 findings in them are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address2

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
FORTUNECertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open
FORTUNECertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports26

2 High, 24 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in FORTUNEUM.solFORTUNE · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `FORTUNEUM` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - drain all `BNB` and `FORTUNEUM` tokens from the contract through `claimStuckTokens()`. - enable trading. - update buy and sell fees. - update wallet to wallet fee. - update the marketing wallet. - exclude or include addresses from paying fees. - change the value of `swapTokensAtAmount`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/2bd5bf740db8400589268ecf9eb0f90f/diagrams/centralization_FORTUNEUM-FORTUNEUM-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce or transfer the ownership to malicious address he owns or controls. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/2bd5bf740db8400589268ecf9eb0f90f/diagrams/centralization_FORTUNEUM-Ownable-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighCentralization Risks in FORTUNEUM.solFORTUNE · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `FORTUNEUM` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - drain all `BNB` and `FORTUNEUM` tokens from the contract through `claimStuckTokens()`. - enable trading. - update buy and sell fees. - update wallet to wallet fee. - update the marketing wallet. - exclude or include addresses from paying fees. - change the value of `swapTokensAtAmount`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/2bd5bf740db8400589268ecf9eb0f90f/diagrams/centralization_FORTUNEUM-FORTUNEUM-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce or transfer the ownership to malicious address he owns or controls. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/2bd5bf740db8400589268ecf9eb0f90f/diagrams/centralization_FORTUNEUM-Ownable-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
Low`liquidityShare` and `marketingShare` can be diffFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

Assume the fees are all zero except for `marketingFeeOnBuy` and `marketingFeeOnSell` are `1` as they are in the `constructor()`. In this assume that the fees are gathered using these fees up until `canSwap` would be true and before there is a sell so that `swapAndSendMarketing()` has not been called. Then assume the buy and sell fees are updated so that all fees are zero except for `liquidityFeeOnBuy` and `liquidityFeeOnSell` which are set to 1. Then a sell is executed so that in this case it will `swapAndLiquify()` the entire `contractTokenBalance` as the `marketingShare` will be zero because of the updated fees. However, all those fees were generated to be swapped and sent to the marketing address instead of added to liquidity. In addition, the `walletToWalletTransferFee` is split between marketing and liquidity based on the buy and sell fees. This can cause confusion as to what percentage of a transfer is allocated for marketing versus liquidity.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
Low`liquidityShare` and `marketingShare` can be diffFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

Assume the fees are all zero except for `marketingFeeOnBuy` and `marketingFeeOnSell` are `1` as they are in the `constructor()`. In this assume that the fees are gathered using these fees up until `canSwap` would be true and before there is a sell so that `swapAndSendMarketing()` has not been called. Then assume the buy and sell fees are updated so that all fees are zero except for `liquidityFeeOnBuy` and `liquidityFeeOnSell` which are set to 1. Then a sell is executed so that in this case it will `swapAndLiquify()` the entire `contractTokenBalance` as the `marketingShare` will be zero because of the updated fees. However, all those fees were generated to be swapped and sent to the marketing address instead of added to liquidity. In addition, the `walletToWalletTransferFee` is split between marketing and liquidity based on the buy and sell fees. This can cause confusion as to what percentage of a transfer is allocated for marketing versus liquidity.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction Should Be Declared ExternalFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The following functions are never called internally within the contract and should have external visibility: - `enableTrading()` - `isExcludedFromFees(address account)`

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction Should Be Declared ExternalFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The following functions are never called internally within the contract and should have external visibility: - `enableTrading()` - `isExcludedFromFees(address account)`

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInconsistency between Function Name and FunctionaFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The function `excludeFromFees()` allows not only to exclude an address from fees but also allows to include an address paying fees.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInconsistency between Function Name and FunctionaFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The function `excludeFromFees()` allows not only to exclude an address from fees but also allows to include an address paying fees.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowLeftover tokens caused by the unoptimized one-sidFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The `swapAndLiquify()` function converts half of the `FORTUNEUM` tokens to `BNB`. The other half of `FORTUNEUM` tokens and part of the converted `BNB` tokens are then added as liquidity to the `uniswapV2Pair`. For every `swapAndLiquify()` function call, a small amount of `BNB` is left over in the contract. This is because the price of `FORTUNEUM` drops after swapping the first half into `BNB`, and the other half of `FORTUNEUM` require less than the converted `BNB` to be paired with when adding liquidity. The contract has a `claimStuckTokens()` function, which withdraws the contracts `BNB` balance to the `msg.sender`, so we mark this finding as **informational** as the tokens will not be locked forever.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowLeftover tokens caused by the unoptimized one-sidFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The `swapAndLiquify()` function converts half of the `FORTUNEUM` tokens to `BNB`. The other half of `FORTUNEUM` tokens and part of the converted `BNB` tokens are then added as liquidity to the `uniswapV2Pair`. For every `swapAndLiquify()` function call, a small amount of `BNB` is left over in the contract. This is because the price of `FORTUNEUM` drops after swapping the first half into `BNB`, and the other half of `FORTUNEUM` require less than the converted `BNB` to be paired with when adding liquidity. The contract has a `claimStuckTokens()` function, which withdraws the contracts `BNB` balance to the `msg.sender`, so we mark this finding as **informational** as the tokens will not be locked forever.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles. Specifically: - `enableTrading()` does not emit an event when is executed. - `claimStuckTokens()` emits an event only when `ERC20token.transfer()` is executed. No event is emitted when BNB is withdrawn from the contract.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles. Specifically: - `enableTrading()` does not emit an event when is executed. - `claimStuckTokens()` emits an event only when `ERC20token.transfer()` is executed. No event is emitted when BNB is withdrawn from the contract.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPrivilege not Revoked or TransferredFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

When the contract is deployed the following addresses are exempted from fees: - the current `owner` - the current `marketingWallet` If ownership is transferred or renounced with `transferOwnership()` or `renounceOwnership()`, the exemptions are not granted to the new owner nor are they revoked from the previous owner. Also if `marketingWallet` is updated with `changeMarketingWallet()` the exemptions are not granted to the new marketing wallet nor are they revoked from the previous marketing address.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPrivilege not Revoked or TransferredFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

When the contract is deployed the following addresses are exempted from fees: - the current `owner` - the current `marketingWallet` If ownership is transferred or renounced with `transferOwnership()` or `renounceOwnership()`, the exemptions are not granted to the new owner nor are they revoked from the previous owner. Also if `marketingWallet` is updated with `changeMarketingWallet()` the exemptions are not granted to the new marketing wallet nor are they revoked from the previous marketing address.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowSolidity Version Not RecommendedFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The contract uses the latest solidity version available at the moment which is `0.8.17`. Using the most recent version can be risky as all bugs for the current version may not be known.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowSolidity Version Not RecommendedFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The contract uses the latest solidity version available at the moment which is `0.8.17`. Using the most recent version can be risky as all bugs for the current version may not be known.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird Party DependencyFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with a third party AMM protocol. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird Party DependencyFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with a third party AMM protocol. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()` CallFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The return value of the transfer() call is not checked. ```solidity=760 ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance); ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()` CallFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The return value of the transfer() call is not checked. ```solidity=760 ERC20token.transfer(msg.sender, balance); ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnused InterfaceFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

```solidity=20 interface IUniswapV2Pair { ``` - `IUniswapV2Pair` is declared but never used.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnused InterfaceFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

```solidity=20 interface IUniswapV2Pair { ``` - `IUniswapV2Pair` is declared but never used.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUsage of Magic NumbersFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The linked magic numbers are hardcoded in the codebase.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUsage of Magic NumbersFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

The linked magic numbers are hardcoded in the codebase.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariable That Could Be Declared as ImmutableFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

`uniswapV2Pair` assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariable That Could Be Declared as ImmutableFORTUNE · CertiKOpen

`uniswapV2Pair` assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Fortuneum security record · Every Fortuneum address · This address on the explorer