0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b on BNB Chain as a contract of space-dex.io. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 3 Apr 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stake Space Dex | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 Medium, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `FalconPool`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown below: - `getInvalidTokens()`: will move out non `FNL` token to the given destination. - `togglePause()`: will set the contract to pause or unpause, which will influence functions with `whenPaused` or `whenNotPaused` modifier. - `transferOwnership()`: will transfer ownership to a new address. - `renounceOwnership()`: will transfer ownership to address(0). Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and violate the contract functionalities.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived at the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. According to the deployment address at [0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b | BSC](https://bscscan.com/address/0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b#code), the FLN token is at the address [0x37d39950f9c753d62529dbf68fcb4dca4004fbfd | BSC](https://bscscan.com/address/0x37d39950f9c753d62529dbf68fcb4dca4004fbfd#code), which is a deflationary token. It is important to note that the token should exclude the falcon pool from the fee to avoid potential loss.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the FalconPool contract, users who have staked `FNL` tokens and earned `BNB` rewards have the option to claim their rewards and exit the contract using the `harvest()` and `withdrawn()` functions. Or to exit the contract immediately using the `emergencyWithdrawn()` function. However, if a user chooses to use the `emergencyWithdrawn()` function, their rewards will be erased simultaneously, which means that the BNB reward will be left inside the contract and will be locked, or unable to be withdrawn. In the commit [df9d8f6acfa4f7ffab6374a29bcb68ce7d9c5e98](https://github.com/spcdex-io/contracts/commit/df9d8f6acfa4f7ffab6374a29bcb68ce7d9c5e98), the reward distribution logic is updated, which might introduce precision loss due to division operation ```solidity function deposit() external payable nonReentrant { uint256 amount = msg.value; require(totalStaked > 0 && amount >= 1000000, "Invalid deposit"); pointsXtoken = pointsXtoken.add(amount.mul(10e18).div(totalStaked)); unclaimedTokens = unclaimedTokens.add(amount); totalDistributed = totalDistributed.add(amount); lastBlock = block.number; emit Deposit(amount, totalStaked); } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe space-dex.io security record · Every space-dex.io address · This address on the explorer