space-dex.io contract 0x3520…f11b on BNB Chain

0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b on BNB Chain as a contract of space-dex.io. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 3 Apr 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Stake Space DexCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 Medium, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

MediumCentralization Related RisksStake Space Dex · CertiKOpen

In the contract `FalconPool`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown below: - `getInvalidTokens()`: will move out non `FNL` token to the given destination. - `togglePause()`: will set the contract to pause or unpause, which will influence functions with `whenPaused` or `whenNotPaused` modifier. - `transferOwnership()`: will transfer ownership to a new address. - `renounceOwnership()`: will transfer ownership to address(0). Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and violate the contract functionalities.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowIncompatibility with Deflationary TokensStake Space Dex · CertiKAcknowledged

When transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived at the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. According to the deployment address at [0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b | BSC](https://bscscan.com/address/0x35209fab3323866778f147ecb898d09d799af11b#code), the FLN token is at the address [0x37d39950f9c753d62529dbf68fcb4dca4004fbfd | BSC](https://bscscan.com/address/0x37d39950f9c753d62529dbf68fcb4dca4004fbfd#code), which is a deflationary token. It is important to note that the token should exclude the falcon pool from the fee to avoid potential loss.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Leftover BNBStake Space Dex · CertiKAcknowledged

In the FalconPool contract, users who have staked `FNL` tokens and earned `BNB` rewards have the option to claim their rewards and exit the contract using the `harvest()` and `withdrawn()` functions. Or to exit the contract immediately using the `emergencyWithdrawn()` function. However, if a user chooses to use the `emergencyWithdrawn()` function, their rewards will be erased simultaneously, which means that the BNB reward will be left inside the contract and will be locked, or unable to be withdrawn. In the commit [df9d8f6acfa4f7ffab6374a29bcb68ce7d9c5e98](https://github.com/spcdex-io/contracts/commit/df9d8f6acfa4f7ffab6374a29bcb68ce7d9c5e98), the reward distribution logic is updated, which might introduce precision loss due to division operation ```solidity function deposit() external payable nonReentrant { uint256 amount = msg.value; require(totalStaked > 0 && amount >= 1000000, "Invalid deposit"); pointsXtoken = pointsXtoken.add(amount.mul(10e18).div(totalStaked)); unclaimedTokens = unclaimedTokens.add(amount); totalDistributed = totalDistributed.add(amount); lastBlock = block.number; emit Deposit(amount, totalStaked); } ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The space-dex.io security record · Every space-dex.io address · This address on the explorer