DEBT Box contract 0x3f37…cbed on BNB Chain

0x3f3701e818a560eacd6fca1477e36b9338a2cbed

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x3f3701e818a560eacd6fca1477e36b9338a2cbed on BNB Chain as a contract of DEBT Box. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 13 Apr 2023. 17 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
GrowCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports17

2 High, 15 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in GROWGrow · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `GROW` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify different token settings such as the UniSwap (PancakeSwap) router, dividends and fees. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/74c3b3203c4646ea8c2e037b68b82651/diagrams/centralization_GROW-GROW-_owner.svg) Furthermore, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions `renounceOwnership()` and `transferOwnership()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce and transfer ownership at any time.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionGrow · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the `GROW` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `GROW` tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowDeclaration Naming ConventionGrow · CertiKOpen

One or more declarations do not conform to the [Solidity style guide](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.3/style-guide.html#naming-conventions) with regards to its naming convention. Particularly: - `camelCase`: Should be applied to function names, argument names, local and state variable names, modifiers - `UPPER_CASE`: Should be applied to `constant` variables - `CapWords`: Should be applied to contract names, struct names, event names and enums

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction And Variable Naming Doesn't Match The OpGrow · CertiKOpen

The `GROW` contract uses `Pancakeswap` for swapping and adding liquidity to `Pancakeswap` pool, but naming it `Uniswap`. Function `swapTokensForEth(uint256 tokenAmount)` swaps `YUMMY` token for BNB instead of ETH.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction Should Be Declared ExternalGrow · CertiKOpen

The functions which are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility for gas optimization.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInconsistent Comment and CodeGrow · CertiKOpen

The highlighted comment does not reflect what the function below is doing.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowLocked BNBGrow · CertiKOpen

The contract has one payable function, but does not have a function to withdraw the funds.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsGrow · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowOpenZeppelin Library Code Included in Source CodeGrow · CertiKOpen

It is highly recommended NOT to include OpenZeppelin library code directly in source code, but import the original library to minimize risk because even slight changes to the library code may lead to critical/major vulnerabilities/bugs. For Solidity version 0.8.x, the latest OpenZeppelin version 4.7.3 should be used.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Risks on Approval/TransferFrom MethodsGrow · CertiKOpen

The `approve` function could be used in an attack that allows a spender to transfer more tokens than the owner of the tokens ever wanted to allow the spender to transfer. Here is a possible attack scenario: Alice allows Bob to transfer N of Alice's tokens (N>0) by calling `approve()` method on `Grow` smart contract passing Bob's address and N as method arguments. After some time, Alice decides to change from N to M (M>0) the number of Alice's tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls approve method again, this time passing Bob's address and M as method arguments. Bob notices Alice's second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls `transferFrom()` method to transfer N Alice's tokens somewhere. If Bob's transaction is executed before Alice's transaction, then Bob will successfully transfer N Alice's tokens and will gain the ability to transfer another M tokens. Before Alice noticed that something went wrong, Bob calls `transferFrom()` method again, this time to transfer M Alice's tokens. So, Alice's attempt to change Bob's allowance from N to M (N>0 and M>0) made it possible for Bob to transfer N+M of Alice's tokens, while Alice never wanted to allow so many of her tokens to be transferred by Bob. ERC20 API: An Attack Vector on Approve/TransferFrom Methods: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YLPtQxZu1UAvO9cZ1O2RPXBbT0mooh4DYKjA_jp-RLM/edit#heading=h.m9fhqynw2xvt

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Sandwich AttacksGrow · CertiKOpen

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The `swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` function is called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering this function are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird Party DependencyGrow · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. The contract `GROW` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapV2Router`: ```solidity=472 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router; ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowToo Many DigitsGrow · CertiKOpen

Literals with many digits are difficult to read and review.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnlocked Compiler VersionGrow · CertiKOpen

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUsage of Magic NumberGrow · CertiKOpen

The `_transfer()` function uses the magic number `20` as the fee for the council and dividend.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariable Could be Declared as `constant`Grow · CertiKOpen

Variables `_name`, `_symbol`, `_decimals` and `_initialSupply` could be declared as `constant` since these state variables are hardcoded in the constructor and never to be changed.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableGrow · CertiKOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

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