MagicCraft contract 0x76ae…615d on BNB Chain

0x76ae87e1c364ead343251ee7dfa2415b4678615d

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x76ae87e1c364ead343251ee7dfa2415b4678615d on BNB Chain as a contract of MagicCraft. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 28 Sep 2022. 5 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Magiccraft - MagicMarketplaceCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports5

2 High, 3 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in MagicMarketplace.solMagiccraft - MagicMarketplace · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `MagicMarketplace` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the protocol. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/58ba2a0d3e4c4a83bc6da002f4733337/diagrams/centralization_MagicMarketplace-MagicMarketplace-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeMagiccraft - MagicMarketplace · CertiKAcknowledged

TransparentUpgradeableProxy is an upgradeable contract, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and inject malicious implementation into the implementation contract behind the proxy .

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowIncorrect AssumptionMagiccraft - MagicMarketplace · CertiKAcknowledged

In function `_escrow()` and `_transfer()`, `ftContract.transferFrom(address(this), _receiver, _tokenId);` is assumed to throw if any error. However, this is an incorrect assumption because the address of `_nftContract` cannot guarantee a NFT address nor the `transferFrom()` cannot guarantee to revert if the transfer fails. This is because that the value of `_nftAddress` is from input argument and there's no check to validate if `_nftAddress.transferFrom()` is correctly implemented.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInvalid NFT Implementation CheckMagiccraft - MagicMarketplace · CertiKAcknowledged

The goal of function `_getNftContract()` is designed to check if the contract in given `_nftAddress` address is a valid ERC721 deployment with correct ERC721 functionality. However current function can not validate the implementation in `_nftAddress`

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInvalid Ownership ValidationMagiccraft - MagicMarketplace · CertiKAcknowledged

In function `createAuction()`, `_owns` is implemented to validate ownership of the token in NFT contract in `_nftAddress` address. However due to the value of `_nftAddress` being from input argument, the implementation correctness of `_nftContract.ownerOf` cannot be guaranteed.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The MagicCraft security record · Every MagicCraft address · This address on the explorer