Morse contract 0x77a2…37fd on BNB Chain

0x77a2e1f08b2bbfd459d10231c6edce01645337fd

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x77a2e1f08b2bbfd459d10231c6edce01645337fd on BNB Chain as a contract of Morse. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 22 Feb 2024. 4 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Morse Chat - auditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports4

2 High, 1 Medium, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksMorse Chat - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract **Morse**, the role **owner** has authority over the following functions. Any compromise to the **owner** account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - function blacklist(), protecting any account from sending and receiving `Morse` token assets. - function renounceOwnership(), giving up ownership. - function transferOwnership(), transfer ownership to malicious account.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionMorse Chat - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the `initialSupply` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumPotential Bypass of BlackList RestrictionMorse Chat - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

The protocol has implemented a blacklist feature for security requirements. A blacklisted user will not be able to send or receive tokens. Therefore, before the token is transferred, the protocol checks if the sender or the receiver is blacklisted. However, a malicious user can montior the mempool and if he detects the admin is setting up a blacklist, he can front-run the transaction and transfer the token to another address to avoid being blacklisted.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnused CodeMorse Chat - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

The linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either remnants of test code or older functionality.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Morse security record · Every Morse address · This address on the explorer