0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371 on BNB Chain as a contract of Whale. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 25 Jan 2025. 6 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whale Token - audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 2 Medium, 3 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All of the `Whale` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project. ### Onchain Analysis(01/22/2025) The contract has been deployed at address [0x96e8d3a52Dd950AaCC8d1749932e1C14BC76e371](https://bscscan.com/address/0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371) by the deployer [0xE660ac26DDe19D6A3Ea89f53ce36310b7a8C8556](https://bscscan.com/address/0xE660ac26DDe19D6A3Ea89f53ce36310b7a8C8556) in the transaction [0xb88d905c319aa31461407cf25d42ccc8a55a095b3916b1e7750d266a5a382540](https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb88d905c319aa31461407cf25d42ccc8a55a095b3916b1e7750d266a5a382540). During the deployment, all 10,000,000,000 `Whale` tokens were sent to the deployer. Subsequently, these tokens were transferred from the deployer to [0xC0826c376c59DEa41dE19BB5b077Bb28c1213923](https://bscscan.com/address/0xC0826c376c59DEa41dE19BB5b077Bb28c1213923), which is responsible for distributing them to other accounts for various purposes. The related token transfer information can be found [here](https://bscscan.com/token/0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371?a=0xc0826c376c59dea41de19bb5b077bb28c1213923). It is noted that [0xC0826c376c59DEa41dE19BB5b077Bb28c1213923](https://bscscan.com/address/0xC0826c376c59DEa41dE19BB5b077Bb28c1213923) transferred 1,500,000,000 tokens to [0x44F475Af893dc31475c148E76718B1F17BfbEBd2](https://bscscan.com/address/0x44F475Af893dc31475c148E76718B1F17BfbEBd2). The latter then added these tokens to the pool [0x4f3066dF23cB802f03C02340AC2ABc25ce882432](https://bscscan.com/address/0x4f3066df23cb802f03c02340ac2abc25ce882432) and received 424,264.06871192 LP tokens in the transaction [0xabb1ee98091af3ece13ce2b90f6e016fc8a36e17442700ee2c46c49a8d9a8a20](https://bscscan.com/tx/0xabb1ee98091af3ece13ce2b90f6e016fc8a36e17442700ee2c46c49a8d9a8a20). Later, [0x44F475Af893dc31475c148E76718B1F17BfbEBd2](https://bscscan.com/address/0x44F475Af893dc31475c148E76718B1F17BfbEBd2) locked 400,000 tokens in the transaction [0x49fb96ea6836efd73489710e32c1d91d4346d01650b870fa4e075ad113706ff2](https://bscscan.com/tx/0x49fb96ea6836efd73489710e32c1d91d4346d01650b870fa4e075ad113706ff2). For a list of LP token holders, refer to the following link: [LP holders](https://bscscan.com/token/0x4f3066df23cb802f03c02340ac2abc25ce882432#balances).
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe deployed smart contract at address [0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371](https://bscscan.com/address/0x96e8d3a52dd950aacc8d1749932e1c14bc76e371) lacks a mechanism for privileged roles to recover tokens that may be accidentally transferred to the contract. This oversight results in the inability to retrieve valuable tokens that are stuck within the contract. Without such a feature, any tokens sent to the contract address by mistake cannot be recovered.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract has a `receive()` function or payable functions, making it able to receive native tokens. However, it does not have a function to withdraw the funds, which can lead to permanently locked tokens within the contract. ```solidity=288 receive() external payable {} ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract inherits from the `Ownable` contract, a standard module that provides basic access control. However, despite this inheritance, the contract does not seem to utilize any of the owner-exclusive functions. This lack of owner-specific functionality raises the possibility that the contract might not actually need the ownership mechanism offered by the `Ownable` module. It is noted that the ownership has been renounced in the transaction [0xfd6c3ff3ad9e0d5eca118215872aed994a4a562c49fea08805b9c297119ee472](https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfd6c3ff3ad9e0d5eca118215872aed994a4a562c49fea08805b9c297119ee472).
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Whale security record · Every Whale address · This address on the explorer