0x9dce13e71b11eb5df66ca269bd657696587fd4e2
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x9dce13e71b11eb5df66ca269bd657696587fd4e2 on BNB Chain as a contract of Project Ailey. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 19 Sep 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All of the `Ailey` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project. ### On-chain analysis As the time of 09/14/2023, all the `Ailey` tokens have been transferred to the following accounts by the initial token holder [0x653f5c544b0053f32d04407c1ceec5789c8a9e12](https://bscscan.com/address/0x653f5c544b0053f32d04407c1ceec5789c8a9e12). - [0x3726B181FF6aeC590932044410ff4A07Ab232073](https://bscscan.com/address/0x3726B181FF6aeC590932044410ff4A07Ab232073) - 400,000,000 EOA - [0x4933f82e6cd2b6aee34f25e330b49F7609E50236](https://bscscan.com/address/0x4933f82e6cd2b6aee34f25e330b49F7609E50236) - 155,000,000 TokenVesting contract - [0xbc9dC203abe6E93F1392FFc0A1c23cB1a4934a32](https://bscscan.com/address/0xbc9dC203abe6E93F1392FFc0A1c23cB1a4934a32) - 132,500,000 TokenVesting contract - [0x5adfa7257dC7E445B3fA1e0B4b37317C25F448a1](https://bscscan.com/address/0x5adfa7257dC7E445B3fA1e0B4b37317C25F448a1) - 100,000,000 TokenVesting contract - [0x7c4f6Fc652c95aB24024d4Cbd321d6260BF2eFB9](https://bscscan.com/address/0x7c4f6Fc652c95aB24024d4Cbd321d6260BF2eFB9) - 70,000,000 TokenVesting contract - [0x87deE7E40eE255440b3cC98E97f56F182f947930](https://bscscan.com/address/0x87deE7E40eE255440b3cC98E97f56F182f947930) - 50,000,000 EOA - [0xB38c3FAe7410AD98fcFAbca5b2e2F5f7f386E2D2](https://bscscan.com/address/0xB38c3FAe7410AD98fcFAbca5b2e2F5f7f386E2D2) - 33,750,000 TokenVesting contract - [0xB9fB1ede5abF2b399523CF75F62eF3047002eFF1](https://bscscan.com/address/0xB9fB1ede5abF2b399523CF75F62eF3047002eFF1) - 20,000,000 TokenVesting contract - [0x7f5f695034E230E3D671576448089f59188A2aEC](https://bscscan.com/address/0x7f5f695034E230E3D671576448089f59188A2aEC) - 18,750,000 EOA - [0xF5D14976190B974457e33D402D35154D2ecC05e7](https://bscscan.com/address/0xF5D14976190B974457e33D402D35154D2ecC05e7) - 10,000,000 EOA - [0xA73937a719D6E68c2df426cDA420D4C7059d2505](https://bscscan.com/address/0xA73937a719D6E68c2df426cDA420D4C7059d2505) - 10,000,000 EOA
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the contract `ERC20Permit`, the `permit()` function is able to perform the approval. However, it is noted that the structure of `_nonces` is a mapping of addresses to `Counters.Counter` and the `_nonces[owner]` will increase after used successfully, which implies the `owner` has at most one valid signature, even for different `spender`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe compiler for Solidity 0.8.20 switches the default target EVM version to [Shanghai](https://blog.soliditylang.org/2023/05/10/solidity-0.8.20-release-announcement/#important-note), which includes the new `PUSH0` op code. This op code may not yet be implemented on all L2s, so deployment on these chains will fail. To work around this issue, use an earlier [EVM](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.20/using-the-compiler.html?ref=zaryabs.com#setting-the-evm-version-to-target) [version](https://book.getfoundry.sh/reference/config/solidity-compiler#evm_version)
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Project Ailey security record · Every Project Ailey address · This address on the explorer