Singularity Hubs contract 0xc19c…d751 on BNB Chain

0xc19c1bdc6e4f2d3350a63b4846399010a1ded751

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xc19c1bdc6e4f2d3350a63b4846399010a1ded751 on BNB Chain as a contract of Singularity Hubs. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 1 Aug 2022. 16 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
SingularityCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports16

5 High, 2 Medium, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in EneToken.solSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `EneToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.\ Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do any of the following: - steal all the tokens from every future transfer by setting the `burnAddress` to an address he/she controls and setting the `burnRate` to 100 - have complete control over all future tokens minted by setting themselves as the only `minter` and minting an unlimited amount of tokens to an address he/she controls ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/b8ff6e7bbcdd49c7a4d695c5ff28813b/diagrams/centralization_EneToken-EneToken-_owner.svg) ---- In the contract `EneToken` the role `minter` has authority over the function `mint()`. Any compromise to a `minter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint an unlimited amount of tokens to an address he/she controls until their privilege is revoked by the `_owner`.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighCentralization Risks in Pledge.solSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `Pledge` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.\ Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do any of the following: - set the `sgtAddress`, `eneAddress`, and `lpAddress` to incompatible addresses, which can disrupt contract functionality - arbitrarily set `plan`s, which can disrupt contract functionality or allow the hacker to create any `plan` they could possibly benefit from ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/0e0f3a6930e2452db55cd15c03492056/diagrams/centralization_Pledge-Pledge-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighCentralization Risks in SGT.solSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `SGT` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.\ Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do any of the following: - drain the funds from the `withdrawFrom` address by setting their own `withdrawInfo` arbitrarily and performing `withdraw`s - prevent any user from performing `withdraw`s by calling `cancelWithdraw()` with the user's address - burn any amount of tokens from any account ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/fd51c9d8a9c24e6aad86dee5896f3617/diagrams/centralization_SGT-SGT-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the `SGT` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `SGT` tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumNo Upper Limit For`_burnRate`Singularity · CertiKAcknowledged

The owner can set the `_burnRate` in function `setBurnRate` and there is no upper limit on what the rate can be. In the extreme case, the rate can be as high as 100%, which would imply that users cannot get any token back in transferring operation.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumUnused Return ValueSingularity · CertiKAcknowledged

The return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
Low`setPlan()` Allows Owner To Change Previous PlansSingularity · CertiKOpen

Pre-set staking plans are created upon contract deployment. The function `setPlan` allows the contract owner to create new staking plans. \ However, there is no check to ensure previous plans are not overridden, which could disrupt contract functionality.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowComparison to Boolean ConstantSingularity · CertiKOpen

Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction Should Be Declared `external`Singularity · CertiKOpen

The functions which are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility for gas optimization.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowLack of DocumentationSingularity · CertiKOpen

The contracts `SGT`, `Pledge`, and `EneToken` lack comments explaining the methodology and the reasoning behind the calculation and implementation. Detailed documentation could benefit future code reviewers and improve the project's transparency.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsSingularity · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Zero Address ValidationSingularity · CertiKOpen

Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnclear CodeSingularity · CertiKOpen

The logic behind the `setWithdrawInfo()` function is unclear and seems to be very centralized. It appears that the owner of the `SGT.sol` contract, which is an externally owned account, must use `setWithdrawInfo()` to create `pendingBalances` for every user that wants to interact with the contract. However, users cannot interact with the `SGT.sol` contract directly, and must first choose a staking plan within the `Pledge.sol` contract to receive SGT tokens as a reward. It seems that receiving this reward would not work, since the owner of `SGT.sol` has authority over many of the functions; or receiving the reward would depend on whether the owner has created a `pendingBalances` for a specific address.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUser-Defined GettersSingularity · CertiKOpen

The linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as `immutable`Singularity · CertiKOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Singularity Hubs security record · Every Singularity Hubs address · This address on the explorer