0xdd6978f36c98aff4287e5ac803c9cf1b865641f6
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xdd6978f36c98aff4287e5ac803c9cf1b865641f6 on BNB Chain as a contract of Jerry Inu. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 12 May 2023. 5 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jerry Inu - Audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 1 Medium, 3 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All Jerry Inu tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute Jerry Inu tokens without the consensus of the community.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportVariable `_rOwned[account]` is not updated in the function `includeInReward()`, which will make the accounts included siphon off the tokens out of the balances of all token holders. The Rate was higher at the moment of the `excludeFromReward(account)` call, so the `_rOwned[account] / _tOwned[account]` ratio is bigger than expected for accounts included in the reward. ```solidity=290 function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner { require(_isExcluded[account], "Account is not excluded"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the traditional deflationary token the function `swapAndLiquify()` will use the token for liquidity fees to add liquidity. However, there is no liquidity fee in the Jerry Inu token, and there is no added liquidity operation in `swapAndLiquify()` as well. All fee tokens (`marketingFee`) will be swapped to the BNB and sent to the marketing wallet.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: ```solidity=500 router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, // accept any amount of ETH path, address(this), block.timestamp ); ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=128 uint256 private _tTotal = 420 *10**15 * 10**_decimals; ``` - `_tTotal` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=131 uint256 public swapTokensAtAmount = 1e14 * 10**_decimals; ``` - `swapTokensAtAmount` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=133 address public deadWallet = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD; ``` - `deadWallet` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=134 address public marketingWallet = 0x6f7B7C560D748e264B61035eC97Da8D74a896c6d; ``` - `marketingWallet` should be declared `constant`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Jerry Inu security record · Every Jerry Inu address · This address on the explorer