HyperonChain contract 0xe3d2…ef60 on BNB Chain

0xe3d2ba4ebcc6e9ae3569d6418bc2eaabb8feef60

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xe3d2ba4ebcc6e9ae3569d6418bc2eaabb8feef60 on BNB Chain as a contract of HyperonChain. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 30 Sep 2022. 5 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
HyperonChain - AuditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports5

2 High, 3 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksHyperonChain - Audit · CertiKOpen

In the contract `HyperonChain`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions that include `onlyOwner` modifier: - `transferOwner()` - `renounceOwnership()` - `approveContractContingency()` - `setNewRouter()` - `setLpPair()` - `setInitializers()` - `setExcludedFromLimits()` - `setDividendExcluded()` - `setExcludedFromFees()` - `setExcludedFromProtection()` - `removeSniper()` - `setProtectionSettings()` - `setWallets()` - `setTaxes()` - `setRatios()` - `setMaxTxPercent()` - `setMaxWalletSize()` - `setSwapSettings()` - `setPriceImpactSwapAmount()` - `setContractSwapEnabled()` - `setRewardsProperties()` - `setReflectorSettings()` - `excludePresaleAddresses()` - `enableTrading()` - `multiSendTokens()` - `manualDeposit()` - `sweepContingency()` Additionally to this, other functions are also restricted to `originalDeployer` address, which by default is set to `msg.owner` and thus, can be considered as an alias of `onlyOwner`. - `setOperator()` - `renounceOriginalDeployer()` In both previous cases, the following required statement is used ```solidity=289 require(msg.sender == originalDeployer, "Can only be called by original deployer."); ``` Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and execute privileged functions. Besides, in the contract HyperonChain, the function `_transfer()` includes the following limitations on transfers: * transfers can be enabled or disabled depending on the configuration set by the development team. * there is a maximum amount control, that once exceeded, further transfers will be reverted. * privileged roles are excluded from previous constraints.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionHyperonChain - Audit · CertiKOpen

All of the **HyperonChain** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute **HyperonChain** tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInconsistent Timestamp CheckHyperonChain - Audit · CertiKOpen

In function `setLpPair()` there is an inconsistency in the **require()** declaration below. ```solidity=368 require(block.timestamp - timeSinceLastPair > 3 days, "Cannot set a new pair this week!"); ``` We understand that the period considered as a week should be at least of 5 days, with at most 7 days. However, the blocking period is set to 3 days.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` MeHyperonChain - Audit · CertiKOpen

Current token transfer approval implementations are vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Sandwich AttacksHyperonChain - Audit · CertiKOpen

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. At some point during the call to `_transfer()`function the following code will be eventually executed ```solidity=601 try dexRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( contractTokenBalance, 0, path, address(this), block.timestamp ) {} catch { return; } ``` As a consequence, when no setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

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