0xeda3866f07566d9379a91a07f8d62e19c03183e0
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xeda3866f07566d9379a91a07f8d62e19c03183e0 on BNB Chain as a contract of HashBit. 2 audit reports on Trustblock list this address, from CertiK and Cyberscope; the newest is CertiK, 10 Jan 2023. 20 findings in them are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HashBit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open | |
| HashBit-Peg HBIT Token | Cyberscope | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 1 Medium, 18 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All **AntiBotBABYTOKEN** tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute **AntiBotBABYTOKEN** tokens without the consensus of the community.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report```solidity=3246 uint256 gas = gasForProcessing; try dividendTracker.process(gas) returns ( uint256 iterations, uint256 claims, uint256 lastProcessedIndex ) { emit ProcessedDividendTracker( iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, true, gas, tx.origin ); } catch {} ``` At the last step of function `AntiBotBABYTOKEN._transfer()`, the `dividendTracker.process()` with constant gas limitation `300000` will be executed. But it may cause the out-of-gas exception in the while loop at L2726. At the last iteration of that loop, the `gasUsed` can still be smaller than `gas`, but the `gasLeft` may be insufficient for the process this time. ```solidity=2726 while (gasUsed < gas && iterations < numberOfTokenHolders) { _lastProcessedIndex++; if (_lastProcessedIndex >= tokenHoldersMap.keys.length) { _lastProcessedIndex = 0; } address account = tokenHoldersMap.keys[_lastProcessedIndex]; if (canAutoClaim(lastClaimTimes[account])) { if (processAccount(payable(account), true)) { claims++; } } iterations++; uint256 newGasLeft = gasleft(); if (gasLeft > newGasLeft) { gasUsed = gasUsed.add(gasLeft.sub(newGasLeft)); } gasLeft = newGasLeft; } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAddresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the contract `BABYTOKENDividendTracker`, the function `excludeFromDividends()` could only exclude users from dividends. If someone is excluded from dividends by mistake, there is no way to recover. In the contract `AntiBotBABYTOKEN`, the function `excludeFromFees()` could only exclude users from fees. If someone is excluded from fees by mistake, there is no way to recover.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(` - `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}()`
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either leftovers from test code or older functionality.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=2824 IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router; ``` - The contract `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapV2Router`. --- ```solidity=2831 address public rewardToken; ``` - The contract `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` interacts with third party contract with `rewardToken` interface via `rewardToken`. --- ```solidity=2851 IPinkAntiBot public pinkAntiBot; ``` - The contract `AntiBotBABYTOKEN` interacts with third party contract with `IPinkAntiBot` interface via `pinkAntiBot`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportOne or more logic contracts do not protect their initializers. An attacker can call the initializer and assume ownership of the logic contract, whereby he/she can perform privileged operations that trick unsuspecting users into believing that he/she is the owner of the upgradeable contract. ```solidity=2508 contract BABYTOKENDividendTracker is OwnableUpgradeable, DividendPayingToken { ``` - `BABYTOKENDividendTracker` is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initializer. ```solidity=2532 function initialize( ``` - `initialize` is an unprotected initializer function.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report```solidity=2145 int256 b = int256(a); ``` - The type conversion `int256(a)` from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the value's sign. --- ```solidity=2177 return int256(map.indexOf[key]); ``` - The type conversion `int256(map.indexOf[key])` from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the value's sign. --- ```solidity=2629 int256(lastProcessedIndex) ``` - The type conversion `int256(lastProcessedIndex)` from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the value's sign. --- ```solidity=2638 int256(processesUntilEndOfArray) ``` - The type conversion `int256(processesUntilEndOfArray)` from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the value's sign.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe HashBit security record · Every HashBit address · This address on the explorer