0x1f16d41f9b3db03b462bdd6c92245ee708d1c103
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x1f16d41f9b3db03b462bdd6c92245ee708d1c103 on Ethereum as a contract of Rangers Protocol. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 16 Oct 2023. 5 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rangers Protocol III | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 4 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In `RPGTokenWithProtection` contract, the `owner` has the authority over the following functions: - LiquidityProtection_setLiquidityProtectionService(IPLPS _plps) - revokeBlocked(address[] calldata _holders, address _revokeTo) - LiquidityProtection_unblock(address[] calldata _holders) - disableProtection() Any compromise to the account may allow the hacker to do the following (but not limited to): - damage the protection mechanism. In `RPGVestingF` contract, the `owner` has the authority over the following functions: - init(IERC20 token, uint256 total,address[] calldata beneficiarys,uint256[] calldata amounts) - setStart(uint256 newStart) - changeaddress(address oldaddr,address newaddr) Any compromise to the account may allow the hacker to do the following (but not limited to): - disrupt the vesting mechanism. In `RPGToken` contract, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the authority over the following functions: - setMintRole(address to) - removeMintRole(address to) - setOperatorRole(address to) - removeOperatorRole(address to) - grantRole(bytes32 role, address account) - revokeRole(bytes32 role, address account) - renounceRole(bytes32 role, address account) In `RPGToken` contract, the `MINTER_ROLE` has the authority over the following functions: - mint(address to, uint256 amount) - renounceRole(bytes32 role, address account) In `RPGToken` contract, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` has the authority over the following functions: - renounceRole(bytes32 role, address account) - addTransferBlacklist(address addr) - removeTransferBlacklist(address addr) - addReceiveBlacklist(address addr) - removeReceiveBlacklist(address addr) Any compromise to these accounts may allow the hacker to do the following (but not limited to): - mint token to any accounts. - block token transfer, mint operations. - role management operations.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe `totalSupply` function in contract **RPGToken** does not return the value that is held in the corresponding state variable of contract **RPGToken**.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAccording to the documentation of Uniswap V3, the `uniswapFactory` address passed by the `computeAddress` function should be the `uniwapFactory` address of the V3 version. The current uniswap version used in the contract is V2, although there is no problem using the V2 version, but there will be problems if the uniswap version used in the contract is V3.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contracts `RPG_ALL_BSC.sol` and `RPG_ALL_ETH.sol` are serving as the underlying entity to interact with third party `PLPS`,`Uniswap` protocols. The contract `RPGToken.sol` is serving as the underlying entity to interact with third party `_mintcontract`. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Rangers Protocol security record · Every Rangers Protocol address · This address on the explorer