a KID called BEAST contract 0x7737…64a4 on Ethereum

0x77372a4cc66063575b05b44481f059be356964a4

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x77372a4cc66063575b05b44481f059be356964a4 on Ethereum as a contract of a KID called BEAST. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 26 Jan 2023. 4 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
A Kid Called BeastCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports4

1 Medium, 3 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

MediumCentralization Risks in AKCB.solA Kid Called Beast · CertiKOpen

In the contract `AKCB` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown below. - `setVerificationHash()`: Set the hash of the "merkleroot". - `withdraw()`: withdraw the ethers to the owner's address. - `setNewRound()`: set all the information for the minting (such as the `Price`, `nftPerAddressLimit`). - `setURIManager()`: Set an address for the IPFS manager. - `setSaleStarted()`: Active/Deactivate the `mint()` function for buying the NFTs. - `setOnlyBeastListed()`: Activate/Deactivate the whitelist for sale. - `setTeamReserveAddr()`: Set the address of the `teamReserveAddr`. - `renounceOwnership()`: Transfer the ownership to the address(0). - `transferOwnership()`: Transfer the ownership of the contract to an arbitrary address. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and **withdraw** the funds from the contract or activate a sale with an unexpected price. --- In the contract `AKCB` the role `teamReserveAddr` has authority over the functions shown below. - `mintReserves()`: Mint any type of `AKCB` NFT. - `mintHoodReserve()`: Mint `AKCB` NFT with a certain type. Any compromise to the `teamReserveAddr` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and **mint** `AKCB` NFT to the same address. --- In the contract `AKCB` the role `uriManagerAddr` has authority over the functions shown below. - `setBaseURI()`: Set the `baseURI` of the project. Any compromise to the `uriManagerAddr` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set an arbitrary URI for the project. As of Jan-26,2023, the contract is deployed at address [0x77372a4cc66063575b05b44481f059be356964a4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x77372a4cc66063575b05b44481f059be356964a4). The aforementioned roles are multisig addresses and corresponding addresses are listed below: - owner multisig: 0x81CC5b913A872bc815A8a84Ac08a55bC75d93c04 (require 3/4 approve) - eth:0x6a479db0E30C9d25B60E7FD1B9B6cdBbf7CeA20B - eth:0xFaf821dC2098D2266513959d9A60f97BfBDBCf91 - eth:0x24Dd9fc24d84C68C20a26D6f87160eF17064987A - eth:0xa7E68700499EbCC36a00C9a595f2AeFFb688041D - team reserve address: 0x263f8b4a146E85d8fd2BB42bE7fac5aaB0Ba3b7F (require 3/4 approve) - eth:0x6a479db0E30C9d25B60E7FD1B9B6cdBbf7CeA20B - eth:0xFaf821dC2098D2266513959d9A60f97BfBDBCf91 - eth:0x24Dd9fc24d84C68C20a26D6f87160eF17064987A - eth:0xa7E68700499EbCC36a00C9a595f2AeFFb688041D - uriManagerAddr: 0x81CC5b913A872bc815A8a84Ac08a55bC75d93c04 (require 3/4 approve) - eth:0x6a479db0E30C9d25B60E7FD1B9B6cdBbf7CeA20B - eth:0xFaf821dC2098D2266513959d9A60f97BfBDBCf91 - eth:0x24Dd9fc24d84C68C20a26D6f87160eF17064987A - eth:0xa7E68700499EbCC36a00C9a595f2AeFFb688041D

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction `mintReserves()` of the Contract May FaiA Kid Called Beast · CertiKAcknowledged

The function `mintReserves()` reverts if the difference between Male/Female supply and amount is lower than a threshold. Assuming a new round is started, and the first 40 MALES and 10 FEMALES got minted, the reserved address cannot mint anymore.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Error MessagesA Kid Called Beast · CertiKAcknowledged

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Missing Root Hash Update for the New RoA Kid Called Beast · CertiKAcknowledged

The function `setNewRound()` allows the project owner to setup new configurations for a new round. However, the updates of "verification hash" (the root hash) may not be updated in the time since the `setVerificationHash()` is a separate function call. This means that the old verification hash might still be used, potentially causing unexpected consequences. For example, if Alice was included in the previous round but not in the next round, and the owner first calls `setNewRound()` to set up a new round (also increasing the limit of tokens each one can hold) and then updates the verification hash. Alice could potentially mint new AKCB tokens before the verification hash is updated.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

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