0x9df03fba103491fffde4fbc5fea15efaa43c67a5
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x9df03fba103491fffde4fbc5fea15efaa43c67a5 on Ethereum as a contract of NFMart. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 18 Jun 2024. 2 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.
1 High, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All of the initial distributed `NFM` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe `burnFrom` function contains a balance check that erroneously checks the unlocked balance of `msg.sender` instead of the `from` address. When `msg.sender` attempts to burn tokens from `from` address, the function incorrectly checks the unlocked balance of `msg.sender`, potentially allowing burns when the `from` address has insufficient unlocked balance or allowance. Original Code Snippet: ```solidity function burnFrom(address from, uint256 value) public notFrozen(from) { if (timelockList[from].length > 0) { _autoUnlock(from); } require(SafeMath.sub(balanceOf(msg.sender), lockedBalanceOf(msg.sender)) >= value, "not enough balance."); _burnFrom(from, value); } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe NFMart security record · Every NFMart address · This address on the explorer