Babydoge2.0 contract 0xa4e0…5ca4 on Ethereum

0xa4e068e2b8f58e6c3090174a9e4e95f5bb025ca4

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xa4e068e2b8f58e6c3090174a9e4e95f5bb025ca4 on Ethereum as a contract of Babydoge2.0. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 4 Aug 2023. 11 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Babydoge2.CertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports11

2 High, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighInitial Token DistributionBabydoge2. · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the `BabyDoge2` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighSending Ether to Arbitrary DestinationsBabydoge2. · CertiKAcknowledged

The `internalSwap` function calls the `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` function to swap the `BabyDoge2` tokens to BNB/ETH and send the BNB/ETH to the `marketingWallet`/`marketing2Wallet` address. As a result, over time the `marketingWallet` and `marketing2Wallet` address will accumulate a significant portion BNB/ETH. If those are EOAs (Externally Owned Account), the mishandling of their private keys can have devastating consequences for the project as a whole. For the common deflationary token, the entire tokenomic requires certain liquidity to support. However, in the current implementation, the swapped BNB/ETH is transferred to the above-mentioned wallets and not used to add liquidity. Therefore, the entire tokenomic may crash due to lacking enough liquidity in the pool.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowCannot Remove LP Pair from `isLpPair`Babydoge2. · CertiKOpen

In the function `changeLpPair` at the pointed locations, the `newPair` indicated will be added as `lpPair` in the mapping `isLpPair`. Although, there is no way to remove invalid liquidity pool pairs from that mapping in the current codebase.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction `decimals()` Fails UnexpectedlyBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

If the `totalSupply` is zero, the `decimals()` function will revert. Making it impossible for the users to check the decimals of the token.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction `totalSupply` of Contract `Babydoge2` FaBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

It is expected that the `totalSupply` function always succeeds, assuming that its execution does not run out of gas. However, the implementation of `totalSupply` in contract Babydoge2 sometimes reverts.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Zero Address ValidationBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. in ETH: ```solidity=290 isLpPair[newPair] = true; ``` - `newPair` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=328 marketingAddress = payable(marketing); ``` - `marketing` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=329 marketing2Address = payable(marketing2); ``` - `marketing2` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=329 setPresaleAddress(address presale, bool yesno) ``` - `presale` is not zero-checked before being used. --- In BSC: ```solidity=285 isLpPair[newPair] = true; ``` - `newPair` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=322 marketingAddress = payable(marketing2); ``` - `marketing` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=367 setPresaleAddress(address presale, bool yesno) ``` - `presale` is not zero-checked before being used. ---

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowNumber of gas is hardcoded to `35000` which may nBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

The contract contains a hardcoded gas limit of 35000 for calls to `marketingAddress` and `marketing2Address` within the `internalSwap` function. The Ethereum network requires gas for executing operations, and different operations require different amounts of gas. Hardcoding the gas limit could lead to potential risks in terms of compatibility and functionality during future Ethereum chain upgrades. If the gas requirements for operations change in future Ethereum versions and the hardcoded gas limit is insufficient, these calls will fail. This may disrupt the token's normal functionality, potentially halting the swaps or transfers.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` MeBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

Contract `Babydoge2` is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird-Party Dependency UsageBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=182 IRouter02 public swapRouter; ``` - The contract `Babydoge2` interacts with third party contract with `IRouter02` interface via `swapRouter`.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnchecked Success of External CallsBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

The `success` variable of the `.call` functions in `internalSwap` is not checked. ```solidity=371 if(twoThird > 0) {(success,) = marketingAddress.call{value: twoThird, gas: 35000}("");} if(address(this).balance > 0) {(success,) = marketing2Address.call{value: address(this).balance, gas: 35000}("");} ``` ```solidity=363 if(address(this).balance > 0) {(success,) = marketingAddress.call{value: address(this).balance, gas: 35000}("");} ``` In this way, there is no guarantee that the `call` succeded.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableBabydoge2. · CertiKOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

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