SquidGrow contract 0xb405…96ad on Ethereum

0xb4056fe94dca4dcfcb6b9d830434d4abc98496ad

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xb4056fe94dca4dcfcb6b9d830434d4abc98496ad on Ethereum as a contract of SquidGrow. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 5 May 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Old SquidGrow BridgeCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 High, 1 Medium, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksOld SquidGrow Bridge · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `SquidGrowETHBridgeContract` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set the process fee to be a large value; - update the bridging state to keep a user's tokens from being bridged; - update the `squidgrow` token address while users are in the middle of the bridging process; - update the `system` address to an address they control and make themselves the `_receiver` in a call to `bridgeBack()`; - add or remove target chains; ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/de26b62337d9480da639d331d6f84cfc/diagrams/centralization_SquidGrowETHBridgeContract-SquidGrowETHBridgeContract-_owner.svg) In the contract `SquidGrowBSCBridgeContract` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set the process fee to be a large value; - update the bridging state to keep a user's tokens from being bridged; - update the `system` address to an address they control and make themselves the `_receiver` in a call to `bridgeBack()`; - add or remove target chains; ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/92f57d997a2c4de7ac951c517018f6c2/diagrams/centralization_SquidGrowBSCBridgeContract-SquidGrowBSCBridgeContract-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumTrust Assumption for Bridge SystemOld SquidGrow Bridge · CertiKAcknowledged

There is no on-chain verification of the amount of tokens locked on source chain. Further during the unlock process, there is no method to verify that the unlocked token amount is correct. Therefore the unlocking of tokens from the target chain is completely dependent on the `system` account. If the private key of this system account is compromised or if this account unlocks the incorrect amount this will result in a loss of funds. This issue is found in both `SquidGrowETHBridgeContract` and `SquidGrowBSCBridgeContract`.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowRequire Check for State VariableOld SquidGrow Bridge · CertiKOpen

In the function `updateBridgeFee`, the state variable is checked that it is not larger than `MAX_BRIDGE_FEES`. Therefore the `_bridgeFee` can be arbitrarly set by the `governor` account. If _bridgeFee is set larger than `MAX_BRIDGE_FEES` then _bridgeFee can no longer be updated.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The SquidGrow security record · Every SquidGrow address · This address on the explorer