Aiden Labs contract 0xda41…af53 on Ethereum

0xda41fbdf947a818752ef13f4ae6dd6b9a0c5af53

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xda41fbdf947a818752ef13f4ae6dd6b9a0c5af53 on Ethereum as a contract of Aiden Labs. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 8 Jan 2025. 6 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Aiden Labs - AuditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)On Trustblock

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports6

2 High, 4 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

In the contract `Ownable`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - `renounceOwnership()`: transfer ownership to the zero address. - `transferOwnership()`: transfer ownership to a specified address. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer ownership maliciously. --- In the contract `AidenToken`, the role `owner` has authority over the following function: - `setRule()`: set limitations on token purchases for users. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and impose buying limitations maliciously.

The audit on Trustblock
HighInitial Token DistributionAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

All of the **ADN** tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

The audit on Trustblock
LowConcerns On The RuleAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

The tokenomics of the `Aiden` token allow the contract owner to set rules that may restrict users when receiving tokens from a specific pair. We have identified several concerns that need clarification with the client: 1. The owner has the ability to call the `setRule()` function at any time, which can impose or lift limitations, potentially disrupting normal transfer operations for users. 2. The restrictions are designed to prevent users from holding larger amounts of tokens, but they only remain in effect for 26 hours. This behavior seems intentional, and it raises questions about the complete design of this validation process. 3. In the Uniswap-like pair implementation, the condition `from == uniswapPair` is not exclusive to token purchases, as removing liquidity also meets this condition and is subject to the same restrictions. This scenario should be considered in the design. 4. The validation of `maxHoldingAmount` cannot guarantee the maximum number of tokens a wallet can hold, as this validation may be temporary. The tokens held in a wallet may already exceed the `maxHoldingAmount`.

The audit on Trustblock
LowMissing Emit EventsAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

The audit on Trustblock
LowMissing Zero Address ValidationAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

The cited address input is missing a check that it is not `address(0)`.

The audit on Trustblock
LowRedundant StatementsAiden Labs - Audit · CertiKOpen

The linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either remnants of test code or older functionality.

The audit on Trustblock

The Aiden Labs security record · Every Aiden Labs address · This address on the explorer