Runy contract 0x3cf6…45f8 on Polygon (POS)

0x3cf64cc11b0437fd4156cb3e331cd59aaffc45f8

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x3cf64cc11b0437fd4156cb3e331cd59aaffc45f8 on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Runy. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 3 Mar 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Runiverse - AuditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksRuniverse - Audit · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `RuniverseAdministrative` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_RuniverseAdministrative-RuniverseAdministrative-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `adminAddress`. In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `CryptorunModifier` the role `adminAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_CryptorunModifier-CryptorunModifier-adminAddress.svg) In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `CryptorunNFTLinker` the role `adminAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_CryptorunNFTLinker-CryptorunNFTLinker-adminAddress.svg) In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `RuniverseFeeSharer` the role `adminAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_RuniverseFeeSharer-RuniverseFeeSharer-adminAddress.svg) In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `RuniverseAdministrative` the role `adminAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_RuniverseAdministrative-RuniverseAdministrative-adminAddress.svg) Any compromise to the `adminAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update state variables. In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `CryptorunModifier` the role `operatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_CryptorunModifier-CryptorunModifier-operatorAddress.svg) In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `RuniverseFeeSharer` the role `operatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_RuniverseFeeSharer-RuniverseFeeSharer-operatorAddress.svg) In the contract `Runiverse` derived from `RuniverseAdministrative` the role `operatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_RuniverseAdministrative-RuniverseAdministrative-operatorAddress.svg) Any compromise to the `operatorAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. In the contract `Runiverse` the role `endRunOperatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `endRunOperatorAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and call the `endRun` function. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_Runiverse-Runiverse-endRunOperatorAddress.svg) **Note: this finding is based on Certik Syntactic Analyzer.** **Please review the client's code to see if any modification is required.** In the contract `Runiverse` the role `startRunOperatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `startRunOperatorAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and call the `startRun` function. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cbfe91cc11c248d5873ae8f5ecc0a79f/diagrams/centralization_Runiverse-Runiverse-startRunOperatorAddress.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
Low`_totalArenaMinted` should be checked synchronousRuniverse - Audit · CertiKOpen

The `_setArenaFee` function checks if `distributionArenaFeesCounter` is greater than `_totalArenaMinted`, but the `_totalArenaMinted` is updated by the admin asynchronously. If the admin does not update the `_totalArenaMinted` in time, the latest `arenaID` will not get fees. The same issue also happens in the `_setAvatarFee` function, where `_totalAvatarMinted[avatarCurrency]` should be checked synchronously.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnused State VariableRuniverse - Audit · CertiKOpen

The state variable `findMatchTimeout` and `startRunTimeout` are never used in the contract logic.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Runy security record · Every Runy address · This address on the explorer