0x58d70ef99a1d22e1a8f8f0e8f27c1babcf8464f3
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x58d70ef99a1d22e1a8f8f0e8f27c1babcf8464f3 on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Meta Plus Token. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 26 Oct 2023. 6 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Metaplustoken - Audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 5 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
All of the `MTS` tokens are sent to the `tokenOwner`. This is a centralization risk because the the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project. ### On-chain Analysis As of October 23th, 2023, all holders of the `MTS` token are listed below: - [0x3ef7442df454ba6b7c1deec8ddf29cfb2d6e56c7](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x3ef7442df454ba6b7c1deec8ddf29cfb2d6e56c7) - Team Finance: Locking & Staking - 87,500,000 - [0x8f8b7f33ded9af329ff772e851e20e189c58005b](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x8f8b7f33ded9af329ff772e851e20e189c58005b) - EOA - 87,500,000 - [0x9008f9d82e9e37ab72bff767b05765b9e5f83853](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x9008f9d82e9e37ab72bff767b05765b9e5f83853) - EOA - 62,500,000 - [0x3f78728861d5d33406d8db2edd9b0362bb0bc37a](https://polygonscan.com/address/0x3f78728861d5d33406d8db2edd9b0362bb0bc37a) - EOA - 12,500,000 References: [https://polygonscan.com/token/0x58d70ef99a1d22e1a8f8f0e8f27c1babcf8464f3#balances](https://polygonscan.com/token/0x58d70ef99a1d22e1a8f8f0e8f27c1babcf8464f3#balances)
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAddresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=547 payable(feeReceiver_).transfer(msg.value); ``` - `feeReceiver_` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=548 _owner = tokenOwner; ``` - `tokenOwner` is not zero-checked before being used.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked statements do not affect the functionality of the codebase and appear to be either remnants of test code or older functionality. The audit team would like to confirm if this is the case.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=538 uint256 public Optimization = 103120037778758951045; ``` - `Optimization` should be declared `constant`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe return values of the `transfer()` call in the smart contract are not checked. Some ERC-20 tokens' transfer functions return no values, while others return a bool value, they should be handled with care. If a function returns `false` instead of reverting upon failure, an unchecked failed transfer could be mistakenly considered successful in the contract. ```solidity=529 IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(owner(), tokenAmount); ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIt is not recommended to use Solidity's `transfer()` and `send()` functions for transferring native tokens, since some contracts may not be able to receive the funds. Those functions forward only a fixed amount of gas (2300 specifically) and the receiving contracts may run out of gas before finishing the transfer. Also, EVM instructions' gas costs may increase in the future. Thus, some contracts that can receive now may stop working in the future due to the gas limitation. ```solidity=547 payable(feeReceiver_).transfer(msg.value); ``` - `METAPLUSTOKEN.constructor` uses `transfer()`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Meta Plus Token security record · Every Meta Plus Token address · This address on the explorer