Bounty Temple contract 0xb089…cf61 on Polygon (POS)

0xb0891671943e0d500fe0c3e5bba8f0c6c08dcf61

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xb0891671943e0d500fe0c3e5bba8f0c6c08dcf61 on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Bounty Temple. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 1 Mar 2024. 2 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Bounty Temple - AuditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports2

2 High. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in Vesting.solBounty Temple - Audit · CertiKAcknowledged

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. - `renounceOwnership()`: Leaves the contract without owner. - `transferOwnership()`: Transfers the ownership to a new account. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the ownership. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-c15d-cb88bf00-984f-73574bb43e84/diagrams/centralization_Vesting-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Vesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. - `removeVesting()`: Removes the user's claimed information and update the Merkle root. - `updateSignerAddress()`: Updates the signer address. - `pause()`: Pauses the functions. - `unpause()`: Resumes the functions. - `withdrawTokens()`: Withdraws the tokens. - `updateMerkleRoot()`: Updates the Merkle root. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change the configuration, and withdraw tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-c15d-cb88bf00-984f-73574bb43e84/diagrams/centralization_Vesting-Vesting-_owner.svg) Additionally, the amount of the claimable amount for a user is determined by the "signer" role. Due to the issue mentioned in VES-03, the existing implementation lacks constraints to ensure user claimable amounts no more than the `_totalTokens` limitation. Therefore, if the signer is compromised, the attacker may create multiple signatures to claim more tokens than expected.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighPausing Centralization RisksBounty Temple - Audit · CertiKAcknowledged

It is noted that the `_owner` role has the authority to update the status of the `_paused` and further pause/resume the users' claims. Any compromise to the private key of the `_owner` may allow hackers to take advantage of this authority and allow/prevent user access to the claim functionality.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Bounty Temple security record · Every Bounty Temple address · This address on the explorer