As of 3 Nov 2026, Level has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by Quantstamp, dated 29 Mar 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Level Finance | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Medium | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Low | 0 | 14 | 8 |
The protocol is overall underdocumented and underspecified. With a codebase so large and interconnected, there is a distinct need for documentation that can explain the purpose of each contract and how they fit together. Moreover, there is no technical specification to describe how the system should work as a whole. In the absence of such documentation, client-authored test suites are often used in order to arrive at something resembling a list of functional requirements. However, given the almost-entire absence of tests for the two audited repositories, this was not possible during the audit. In light of the above, communication with the client was pursued extensively in order to clarify design decisions and intended behaviour. However, this level of communication rarely suffices to alleviate problems caused by a lack of documentation. As a result, the audit was significantly impaired. Furthermore, the lack of tests increases operational risk for Level Finance, especially given the layered contract calls and interactions. Proper configuration is key for ensuring intended functionality, and yet there are no post-deployment checks.
Open the reportIn LEV-9, we detailed that all LP funds can be locked in the pool for a period of time because of traders who open positions of sufficiently large size. In LEV-8, we detailed that the `Timelock` contract has only a 12-hour delay and has the ability to upgrade the `Pool` contract, allowing for funds to be stolen by the Level Finance team. Together, these issues form the basis for an attack that would allow the Level Finance team to lock all the LP funds and drain them through a coordinated contract upgrade.
Open the reportAfter a 12 hour delay, the timelock can change the `ProxyAdmin`'s owner to a different address, allowing indiscriminate upgrading of the Pool. It is possible for such an upgrade to result in the loss of all the funds in the Pool, or to otherwise enrich the Timelock admin to the exclusion of the LPs. 12 hours is insufficient time to react to the queuing of an upgrade transaction.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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