MegaMoon security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, MegaMoon has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 13 Oct 2022. That report lists 2 open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Megamoon - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | 2 open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings19
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 12 |
CriticalCentralization Risks in MegamoonLottery.solMegamoon - Audit · CertiK · 13 Oct 2022Open
In the contract `MegamoonLottery` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and get DAO fee.  In the contract `MegamoonLottery` the role `operatorAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operatorAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and repeatedly call `closeLottery` in a contract to try the best `finalNumber` by reverting bad `finalNumber`. 
Open the reportCriticalCentralization Risks in MegamoonPilot.solMegamoon - Audit · CertiK · 13 Oct 2022Open
In the contract `MegaMoonPilot` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, add & set the staking pool, update the reward multiplier， and emergency withdraws token.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer the ownership. 
Open the reportHighCentralization Risks in MegamoonDealer.solMegamoon - Audit · CertiK · 13 Oct 2022Open
In the contract `MegamoonDealer` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority，set the lottery address，fee setting，and transfer the contract's ERC tokens.  In the contract `MegamoonDealer` the role `lotteryAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `lotteryAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, inject the lottery and return fund from lottery. 
Open the reportHighCentralization Risks in RandomNumberGenerator.solMegamoon - Audit · CertiK · 13 Oct 2022Open
In the contract `RandomNumberGenerator` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change `keyHash` to impact the random number and withdraw LINK tokens. 
Open the reportLowThird Party DependenciesMegamoon - Audit · CertiK · 13 Oct 2022Open
The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with third party ChainLink Random Oracle protocols. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to be attacted. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, etc.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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