0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6c
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6c on BNB Chain as a contract of SquidGrow. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 17 Oct 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SquidGrow Bridge | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
2 High, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In `SquidGrowBridge`'s parent contracts, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - forceResumeReceive(): resume the message flow in blocking mode and clear the stored payload. - setConfig(): set the configuration of the LayerZero messaging library of the specified version. - setMinDstGas(): set the minimal fees. - setPayloadSizeLimit(): set `payloadSizeLimit`. - setPrecrime(): set `precrime`. - setReceiveVersion(): set the `lzReceive()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setSendVersion(): set the `send()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setTrustedRemote(): set the trusted path for the cross-chain communication. - setTrustedRemoteAddress(): set the trusted remote address. - setUseCustomAdapterParams(): set the `useCustomAdapterParams`. - transferOwnership(): transfer the ownership. - renounceOwnership(): renounce the ownership. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and disrupt the bridge's normal functioning.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contracts `SquidGrowBridge` on Ethereum and BSC serve as a cross-chain bridge, which lets users move assets between the two blockchains. Users can lock tokens in the bridge contract on one blockchain, enabling a corresponding amount of tokens to be unlocked from the bridge contract on the other blockchain. Through the `emergencyWithdraw()` function, the `_owner` can transfer out all ERC20 tokens, including SquidGrow Token, from the bridge contracts. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all tokens. As a result, users who deposit tokens on the source blockchain might be unable to withdraw them on the destination blockchain because of the insufficient balance in the bridge contract. ```solidity=1997 function emergencyWithdraw(address token) external onlyOwner { IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); emit EmergencyWithdraw(token, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportA vast majority of the `SquidGrowBridge` contract is derived from [`OFTCore`](https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solidity-examples/blob/main/contracts/token/oft/v1/OFTCore.sol) by "LayerZero." This falls outside the audit's scope. And the `SquidGrowBridge` contract relies on `lzEndpoint` for sending and receiving messages, which also falls outside the audit's scope. While our audit assumes the functional correctness of out-of-scope entities and treats them as black boxes, issues and privileged functions in `OFTCore` and `lzEndpoint` could impact the entire project. We are not responsible for any issue caused by them. ```solidity=1951 contract SquidGrowBridge is Ownable, OFTCore { ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe SquidGrow security record · Every SquidGrow address · This address on the explorer