SquidGrow contract 0x44b9…2c6c on BNB Chain

0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6c

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6c on BNB Chain as a contract of SquidGrow. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 17 Oct 2023. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
SquidGrow BridgeCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

2 High, 1 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksSquidGrow Bridge · CertiKOpen

In `SquidGrowBridge`'s parent contracts, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - forceResumeReceive(): resume the message flow in blocking mode and clear the stored payload. - setConfig(): set the configuration of the LayerZero messaging library of the specified version. - setMinDstGas(): set the minimal fees. - setPayloadSizeLimit(): set `payloadSizeLimit`. - setPrecrime(): set `precrime`. - setReceiveVersion(): set the `lzReceive()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setSendVersion(): set the `send()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setTrustedRemote(): set the trusted path for the cross-chain communication. - setTrustedRemoteAddress(): set the trusted remote address. - setUseCustomAdapterParams(): set the `useCustomAdapterParams`. - transferOwnership(): transfer the ownership. - renounceOwnership(): renounce the ownership. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and disrupt the bridge's normal functioning.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighPotential for Transferring All TokensSquidGrow Bridge · CertiKOpen

The contracts `SquidGrowBridge` on Ethereum and BSC serve as a cross-chain bridge, which lets users move assets between the two blockchains. Users can lock tokens in the bridge contract on one blockchain, enabling a corresponding amount of tokens to be unlocked from the bridge contract on the other blockchain. Through the `emergencyWithdraw()` function, the `_owner` can transfer out all ERC20 tokens, including SquidGrow Token, from the bridge contracts. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all tokens. As a result, users who deposit tokens on the source blockchain might be unable to withdraw them on the destination blockchain because of the insufficient balance in the bridge contract. ```solidity=1997 function emergencyWithdraw(address token) external onlyOwner { IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); emit EmergencyWithdraw(token, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); } ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowOut of Scope Dependency UsageSquidGrow Bridge · CertiKOpen

A vast majority of the `SquidGrowBridge` contract is derived from [`OFTCore`](https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solidity-examples/blob/main/contracts/token/oft/v1/OFTCore.sol) by "LayerZero." This falls outside the audit's scope. And the `SquidGrowBridge` contract relies on `lzEndpoint` for sending and receiving messages, which also falls outside the audit's scope. While our audit assumes the functional correctness of out-of-scope entities and treats them as black boxes, issues and privileged functions in `OFTCore` and `lzEndpoint` could impact the entire project. We are not responsible for any issue caused by them. ```solidity=1951 contract SquidGrowBridge is Ownable, OFTCore { ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The SquidGrow security record · Every SquidGrow address · This address on the explorer