SquidGrow Bridge

CertiK2 addresses on Ethereum and BNB Chain

Audit

Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed SquidGrow (SquidGrow Bridge) on 17 Oct 2023: 3 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SquidGrow’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low100
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In `SquidGrowBridge`'s parent contracts, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - forceResumeReceive(): resume the message flow in blocking mode and clear the stored payload. - setConfig(): set the configuration of the LayerZero messaging library of the specified version. - setMinDstGas(): set the minimal fees. - setPayloadSizeLimit(): set `payloadSizeLimit`. - setPrecrime(): set `precrime`. - setReceiveVersion(): set the `lzReceive()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setSendVersion(): set the `send()` LayerZero messaging library version. - setTrustedRemote(): set the trusted path for the cross-chain communication. - setTrustedRemoteAddress(): set the trusted remote address. - setUseCustomAdapterParams(): set the `useCustomAdapterParams`. - transferOwnership(): transfer the ownership. - renounceOwnership(): renounce the ownership. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and disrupt the bridge's normal functioning.

HighPotential for Transferring All TokensOpen

The contracts `SquidGrowBridge` on Ethereum and BSC serve as a cross-chain bridge, which lets users move assets between the two blockchains. Users can lock tokens in the bridge contract on one blockchain, enabling a corresponding amount of tokens to be unlocked from the bridge contract on the other blockchain. Through the `emergencyWithdraw()` function, the `_owner` can transfer out all ERC20 tokens, including SquidGrow Token, from the bridge contracts. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all tokens. As a result, users who deposit tokens on the source blockchain might be unable to withdraw them on the destination blockchain because of the insufficient balance in the bridge contract. ```solidity=1997 function emergencyWithdraw(address token) external onlyOwner { IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); emit EmergencyWithdraw(token, IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this))); } ```

LowOut of Scope Dependency UsageOpen

A vast majority of the `SquidGrowBridge` contract is derived from [`OFTCore`](https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solidity-examples/blob/main/contracts/token/oft/v1/OFTCore.sol) by "LayerZero." This falls outside the audit's scope. And the `SquidGrowBridge` contract relies on `lzEndpoint` for sending and receiving messages, which also falls outside the audit's scope. While our audit assumes the functional correctness of out-of-scope entities and treats them as black boxes, issues and privileged functions in `OFTCore` and `lzEndpoint` could impact the entire project. We are not responsible for any issue caused by them. ```solidity=1951 contract SquidGrowBridge is Ownable, OFTCore { ```

Contracts in scope2

AddressChainSource code
0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6cChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source
0x44b9f1c5c9c233d8f21a4ef45b020037fedc2c6cChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Part of SquidGrow’s security record

SquidGrow
Audits16 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Sep 2024, by Hacken.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 16 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open SquidGrow’s security record

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