Biceps Coin contract 0x8e5c…05f8 on BNB Chain

0x8e5cb7626dd949dff56fe2c130b75a8b6f1a05f8

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x8e5cb7626dd949dff56fe2c130b75a8b6f1a05f8 on BNB Chain as a contract of Biceps Coin. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 19 Apr 2024. 12 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Biceps - auditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports12

1 High, 2 Medium, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighInitial Token DistributionBiceps - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

All of the `Biceps` (1,000,000,000,000 BICS) tokens are sent to the externally-owned account (EOA) address `supplyRecipient`. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumContract gains non-withdrawable BNB via the `_swaBiceps - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

The `_swapAndLiquify` function converts half of the `tokenAmount` to BNB. The other half of `tokenAmount` and part of the converted BNB are deposited into the `AntiBotBABYTOKEN-BNB` pool as liquidity. ```solidity=182 function _swapAndLiquify(uint256 tokenAmount) private returns (uint256 leftover) { // Sub-optimal method for supplying liquidity uint256 halfAmount = tokenAmount / 2; uint256 otherHalf = tokenAmount - halfAmount; _swapTokensForCoin(halfAmount); uint256 coinBalance = address(this).balance; if (coinBalance > 0) { (uint amountToken, uint amountCoin, uint liquidity) = _addLiquidity(otherHalf, coinBalance); emit liquidityAdded(amountToken, amountCoin, liquidity); return otherHalf - amountToken; } else { return otherHalf; } } ``` For every `_swapAndLiquify` function call, a small amount of BNB leftover in the contract. This is because the price of `Biceps` drops after swapping the first half of the `Biceps` tokens into BNBs, and the other half of `Biceps` tokens require less than the converted BNB to be paired with it when adding liquidity. The contract provides a way to withdraw the non-Biceps ERC20 tokens. However, the contract doesn't provide a way to withdraw those BNB, and they will be locked in the contract forever.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
MediumPotential Out-of-Gas ExceptionBiceps - audit · CertiKAcknowledged

```solidity=367 if (!_swapping) try dividendTracker.process(gasForProcessing) {} catch {} ``` At the last step of function `Biceps._transfer()`, the `dividendTracker.process()` with constant gas will be executed. But it may cause the out-of-gas exception in the while loop at L467 TokenDividendTracker.sol. At the last iteration of that loop, the `gasUsed` can still be smaller than `gas`, but the `gasLeft` may be insufficient for the process this time. This situation is very likely to occur when the gas paid by the transaction user is less than `gasForProcessing`. ```solidity=467 while (gasUsed < gas && iterations < numberOfTokenHolders) { _lastProcessedIndex++; if (_lastProcessedIndex >= tokenHoldersMap.keys.length) _lastProcessedIndex = 0; address account = tokenHoldersMap.keys[_lastProcessedIndex]; if (_canAutoClaim(lastClaimTimes[account])) { if (claim(account)) { claims++; } } iterations++; uint256 newGasLeft = gasleft(); if (gasLeft > newGasLeft) gasUsed = gasUsed + (gasLeft - newGasLeft); gasLeft = newGasLeft; } ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowInit Functions Are Susceptible To Front-runningBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The `initialize()` functions below are not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. ----- Onchain Data The team successfully executed the deployment of this contract and its initialization within a single transaction: [0x7a3364a511fb1b25902bb78c4b9ca4bed9b9c336dd133dabc0fcc3e2fcb8cdfa](https://bscscan.com/tx/0x7a3364a511fb1b25902bb78c4b9ca4bed9b9c336dd133dabc0fcc3e2fcb8cdfa). However, should the contract be deployed anew, the same problem will persist.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Error MessagesBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowMissing Zero Address ValidationBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=344 rewardToken = _rewardToken; ``` - `_rewardToken` is not zero-checked before being used.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Sandwich AttacksBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

A sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `routerV2.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `routerV2.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `routerV2.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}()`

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowRedundant FalseBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The use of `false` is redundant and does not affect the outcome, making the code less clear and potentially harder to maintain. Simplifying the condition to `if (_tatesPending > 0) {` enhances readability and maintains the intended functionality without unnecessary complexity. ```solidity=331 if (false || _tatesPending > 0) { ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird-Party Dependency UsageBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=43 IUniswapV2Router02 public routerV2; ``` - The contract `Biceps` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `routerV2`.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` CaBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The return values of the `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` calls in the smart contract are not checked. Some ERC-20 tokens' transfer functions return no values, while others return a bool value, they should be handled with care. If a function returns `false` instead of reverting upon failure, an unchecked failed transfer could be mistakenly considered successful in the contract. ```solidity=192 IERC20(rewardToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount); ``` --- ```solidity=13 IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(owner(), amount); ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableBiceps - audit · CertiKOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

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