Biceps Coin has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 19 Apr 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 9 low (9 open, 3 acknowledged).
Initial Token Distribution
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Contract gains non-withdrawable BNB via the `_swa
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Potential Out-of-Gas Exception
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Init Functions Are Susceptible To Front-running
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Error Messages
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Zero Address Validation
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Potential Sandwich Attacks
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Redundant False
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Third-Party Dependency Usage
Biceps - audit · CertiK · 19 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Biceps - audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 medium · 9 low 1 fixed · 3 acknowledged · 9 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Low | 9 | 0 | 0 |
The `initialize()` functions below are not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. ----- Onchain Data The team successfully executed the deployment of this contract and its initialization within a single transaction: [0x7a3364a511fb1b25902bb78c4b9ca4bed9b9c336dd133dabc0fcc3e2fcb8cdfa](https://bscscan.com/tx/0x7a3364a511fb1b25902bb78c4b9ca4bed9b9c336dd133dabc0fcc3e2fcb8cdfa). However, should the contract be deployed anew, the same problem will persist.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.
Open the reportAddresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=344 rewardToken = _rewardToken; ``` - `_rewardToken` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `routerV2.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `routerV2.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` - `routerV2.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}()`
Open the reportThe use of `false` is redundant and does not affect the outcome, making the code less clear and potentially harder to maintain. Simplifying the condition to `if (_tatesPending > 0) {` enhances readability and maintains the intended functionality without unnecessary complexity. ```solidity=331 if (false || _tatesPending > 0) { ```
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=43 IUniswapV2Router02 public routerV2; ``` - The contract `Biceps` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `routerV2`.
Open the reportThe return values of the `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` calls in the smart contract are not checked. Some ERC-20 tokens' transfer functions return no values, while others return a bool value, they should be handled with care. If a function returns `false` instead of reverting upon failure, an unchecked failed transfer could be mistakenly considered successful in the contract. ```solidity=192 IERC20(rewardToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount); ``` --- ```solidity=13 IERC20(tokenAddress).transfer(owner(), amount); ```
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x8e5c…05f80x8e5cb7626dd949dff56fe2c130b75a8b6f1a05f8 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Biceps Coin, dated 19 Apr 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Biceps - audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Biceps Coin.
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 9 low (9 open, 3 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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