ZAH Cards contract 0xa78c…9cfb on BNB Chain

0xa78cc657877406b17f6ff9c7a3f10401d1a89cfb

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xa78cc657877406b17f6ff9c7a3f10401d1a89cfb on BNB Chain as a contract of ZAH Cards. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 6 Oct 2022. 4 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Zahnymous LTDCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports4

2 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Risks in ZAH.solZahnymous LTD · CertiKOpen

In the contract `ZAH` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and: - activate trading prematurely - update the `marketingWallet` and `devWallet` addresses to their own, set fee rates to their maximum, and increase `swapTokensAtAmount` to a large amount, stealing fee funds not designated for them on each `swapBack()` call - exclude their own address from needing to pay fees, giving themselves favorable trading benefits - remove previously added automated market maker pair contract addresses - disable swapping without good reason ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/eef54dc002ba44e8a9e42812dd256d50/diagrams/centralization_ZAH-ZAH-_owner.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionZahnymous LTD · CertiKOpen

All of the ZAH tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute ZAH tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowERC20 Approval Race ConditionZahnymous LTD · CertiKOpen

The approval function of the ERC20 standard possesses a well-known vulnerability whereby two consecutive approvals can be exploited to instead “reset” the approval by consuming the approval that is meant to be replaced with a new one. ```solidity=514 function _approve(address owner, address spender, uint256 amount) private { require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address"); require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address"); _allowances[owner][spender] = amount; emit Approval(owner, spender, amount); } ```

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowThird Party DependencyZahnymous LTD · CertiKOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=951 IUniswapV2Router02 public immutable uniswapV2Router; ``` - The contract `ZAH` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapV2Router`.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The ZAH Cards security record · Every ZAH Cards address · This address on the explorer