0xef3725d9e4b9d758483c86be917ab7321dc2830c
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xef3725d9e4b9d758483c86be917ab7321dc2830c on BNB Chain as a contract of Glow Token V2. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 3 Aug 2022. 21 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on BNB Chain.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Glow Token V2 | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 Critical, 4 High, 3 Medium, 13 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the function `_processRewards`, the gas may be insufficient in the last iteration of the while-loop, which will lead to the reversion of EVM. The function `_transfer` calls the function `_processRewards` when selling, so it may cause the sell transaction can not be executed successfully.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the contract `Ownable`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - renounceOwnership - transferOwnership In the contract `GlowTokenV2`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - ownerCreateLP - ownerUpdatePancakePair - ownerUpdateAMM - ownerLockTeamWallet - ownerBurnInitialToken - ownerSetAirDropper - ownerBoostContract - ownerLockAllTeamTokens - ownerReleaseLP - ownerRemoveLPPercent - ownerUpdateDefaultRewardToken - ownerExtendLPLock - ownerBlacklistWallet - ownerEnableTrading - ownerUpdatePrimaryTaxes - ownerUpdateSecondaryTaxes - ownerUpdateSwapThreshold - ownerTriggerSwap - ownerTriggerLottery - ownerSwitchSwapEnabled - ownerSwitchLotteryEnabled - ownerSwitchRewardsEnabled - ownerSetLotterySettings - ownerSetRewardSettings - ownerSetExcludeFromRewards - ownerSetIncludedToRewards - ownerSetExcludeFromLottery - ownerSetIncludedToLottery - ownerExcludeFromFees - ownerWithdrawMarketingBNB - ownerWithdrawCharityBNB - ownerWithdrawStrandedToken - ownerFixStuckBNB - ownerWithdrawBNB In the contract `GlowTokenV2`, the role `airDropper` has authority over the following functions: - withdrawAirDropTokens - withdrawAirDropTokenPresale Any compromise to these account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe owner can remove the liquidity added by contract. If the `_owner` is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences to the project as a whole.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report```solidity uint256 oldBNB=address(this).balance; _removeLiquidityPercent(100); uint256 newBNB=address(this).balance-oldBNB; require(newBNB>oldBNB); _tracker.totalMarketingBNB+=(newBNB-oldBNB); ``` The `newBNB` should be `address(this).balance` in function `ownerReleaseLP` and `ownerRemoveLPPercent`.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe `20,000,000,000,000` tokens are sent to the centralized address `owner` in function `ownerCreateLP`. The `292,062,312,300,925` tokens are sent to the centralized address `airDropper` in function `withdrawAirDropTokens`. The `70,000,000,000,000` tokens are sent to the centralized address `airDropper` in function `withdrawAirDropTokenPresale`. All these may raise the community's concerns about the centralization issue.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report```solidity=344 function _sendLotteryReward(uint256 percentage) private returns (bool) { uint rand = _random(); while(_balances[holders[rand]]< _lottery.minBalance){ rand = _random(); } address payable winningAddress = payable(holders[rand]); uint256 amountWei = _tracker.totalLotteryBNB*percentage/100; _swapBNBtoRWRD(winningAddress, amountWei); _tracker.totalLotteryBNB-=amountWei; _lottery.lastLottery = block.timestamp; return true; } ``` In function `_sendLotteryReward`, the lottery winner should have more token balance than `_lottery.minBalance` so that he can claim the reward. It is obvious a waste of gas to get the suitable random number in a while loop, which even may use out all the gas and cause the out-of-gas exception.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe function `ownerUpdatePancakePair` updates the router and pair incompletely, which may cause problems. - Only update `_pancakeRouterAddress` is not enough, `_pancakeRouter` has not been updated - The new router has not been approved - Related states has not been updated, such as `_excludeFromRewards`, `_excludeFromLottery`
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportWeak PRNG due to a modulo on `block.timestamp, block.difficulty, msg.sender, block.coinbase, block.number`. These can be influenced by miners to some extent, so they should be avoided.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe variable `_nonce` is used in function `_random` to make a random number. However, it is always the initial zero and never changed.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIt is recommended to add `indexed` keyword for parameters in events, which makes it easier for users to navigate event logs.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe order of external call/transfer and storage manipulation must follow the check-effect-interaction pattern.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn function `_buyTokens`, the transaction may be charged fees, so the max holding of receiver should be `_balances[recipient] + amount - tokenTax`. The fees should not be calculated in the max holding.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn function `_addLiquidity` and `_swapTokensForBNB`, the `_pancakeRouter` transfers token without approval. Although the `_pancakeRouter` is approved with the max allowance in the constructor, the allowance may be decrease to an insufficient amount over time. Besides, if the router has been changed, there will no allowance for the new router, which will cause reversion of transaction.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller. But there are a lot of `require`s in the code that do not have error messages.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn the function `_transferIncluded`, the `newAmount` is sent to `recipient` and the `tokenTax` is sent to `address(this)`. So only emit for `recipient` is not enough.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThere are many functions in the contract which do not check for the given input values, such as zero address validation, BEP20 token address validation.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - _pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens() - _pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH() - _pancakeRouter.removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens() - _pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportIn function `transferFrom`, the event `Transfer` is unnecessary and emitted mistakenly. The balance changes of sender and recipient have already been emitted event in function `_transfer`, so there is no need to emit again. Besides, the recipient does not receive the total amount. The tax is for contract address.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportOnly when `enabled` is true, `_excludeAccountFromRewards(AMM)` is needed. In this way, the EVM will revert transaction if `enabled` is false. Besides, it is better to exclude the AMM account from lottery as well. ```solidity function ownerUpdateAMM(address AMM,bool enabled) public onlyOwner { _automatedMarketMakers[AMM]=enabled; _excludeAccountFromRewards(AMM); emit OwnerUpdateAMM(AMM,enabled); } ```
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Glow Token V2 security record · Every Glow Token V2 address · This address on the explorer