0x0f5d2fb29fb7d3cfee444a200298f468908cc942
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x0f5d2fb29fb7d3cfee444a200298f468908cc942 on Ethereum as a contract of Decentraland. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 11 Sep 2021. 10 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decentraland Token | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 9 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `MANAToken`, the role `owner` has the authority over the following function: - `mint()` - `finishMinting()` - `transferOwnership(address newOwner)` - `pause()` - `unpause()` Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and: - transferring ownership to the malicious account address. - mint an uncapped amount of tokens to any user including the owner itself. - maliciously pausing and unpausing the contract
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe following functions are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the project's scope: - `transferOwnership()` - `pause()` - `unpause()` - `approve()` - `mint()` - `finishMinting()` - `allowance()` - `balanceOf()` The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe `require` function should be used to ensure valid conditions that cannot be detected until execution time. This includes conditions on inputs or return values from calls to external contracts.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe zero address is not verified when calling the following function. - `transfer()` - `transferFrom()` - `approve()` - `mint()`
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportFunctions that affect the status of sensitive variables should be able to emit events as notifications to customers. - `transferOwnership()`
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportAll variable types within Solidity are initialized to their default "empty" value, which is usually zeroed out representation. Particularly: - `uint` / `int`: All `uint` and `int` variable types are initialized at `0` - `address`: All `address` types are initialized to `address(0)` - `byte`: All `byte` types are initialized to their `byte(0)` representation - `bool`: All `bool` types are initialized to `false` - `ContractType`: All contract types (i.e. for a given `contract ERC20 {}` its contract type is `ERC20`) are initialized to their zeroed out address (i.e. for a given `contract ERC20 {}` its default value is `ERC20(address(0))`) - `struct`: All `struct` types are initialized with all their members zeroed out according to this table
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe contract has an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the report`assert` should only be used when the condition should never happen.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked variable declarations do not have a visibility specifier explicitly set.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Decentraland security record · Every Decentraland address · This address on the explorer