As of 3 Nov 2026, Decentraland has 3 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 28 Oct 2021. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decentraland | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Decentraland Token | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Decentraland MANA Token Audit | Security firm: OpenZeppelin | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · blog.openzeppelin.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 9 | 2 | 1 |
In the contract `MANAToken`, the role `owner` has the authority over the following function: - `mint()` - `finishMinting()` - `transferOwnership(address newOwner)` - `pause()` - `unpause()` Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and: - transferring ownership to the malicious account address. - mint an uncapped amount of tokens to any user including the owner itself. - maliciously pausing and unpausing the contract
Open the reportThe following functions are not invoked in any of the contracts contained within the project's scope: - `transferOwnership()` - `pause()` - `unpause()` - `approve()` - `mint()` - `finishMinting()` - `allowance()` - `balanceOf()` The functions that are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility.
Open the reportThe `require` function should be used to ensure valid conditions that cannot be detected until execution time. This includes conditions on inputs or return values from calls to external contracts.
Open the reportThe zero address is not verified when calling the following function. - `transfer()` - `transferFrom()` - `approve()` - `mint()`
Open the reportFunctions that affect the status of sensitive variables should be able to emit events as notifications to customers. - `transferOwnership()`
Open the reportAll variable types within Solidity are initialized to their default "empty" value, which is usually zeroed out representation. Particularly: - `uint` / `int`: All `uint` and `int` variable types are initialized at `0` - `address`: All `address` types are initialized to `address(0)` - `byte`: All `byte` types are initialized to their `byte(0)` representation - `bool`: All `bool` types are initialized to `false` - `ContractType`: All contract types (i.e. for a given `contract ERC20 {}` its contract type is `ERC20`) are initialized to their zeroed out address (i.e. for a given `contract ERC20 {}` its default value is `ERC20(address(0))`) - `struct`: All `struct` types are initialized with all their members zeroed out according to this table
Open the reportThe contract has an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
Open the reportThe return values `balance` and `remaining` are not used.
Open the report`assert` should only be used when the condition should never happen.
Open the reportThe linked variable declarations do not have a visibility specifier explicitly set.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0f5d…c9420x0f5d2fb29fb7d3cfee444a200298f468908cc942 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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