0x926ff6584b5905cc793cfb19bfc0ad6443671f47
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x926ff6584b5905cc793cfb19bfc0ad6443671f47 on Ethereum as a contract of Pablo DeFi. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 2 Jan 2024. 6 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pablo Defi | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | On Trustblock |
4 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `ERC20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, changing fee, pair and staking address.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. 
The audit on TrustblockThe `PABLOToken` contract will transfer the collected fees to the owner address when the `PABLOStaking` is set to 0. Any compromise to the owner address may allow a hacker to transfer those tokens from the address, resulting in severe damage to the project.
The audit on TrustblockAll of the `PABLO` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
The audit on TrustblockThe `PABLOToken` contract will accumulate fees and then transfer the fees to owner address or `PABLOStaking`. This is a popular design for deflationary token. As for the collected fee, some deflationary tokens (e.g. Safemoon) adds it to to the liquidity pool to be locked forever. On the other hand, `PABLOToken` simply transfers those fees directly to `_owner` and `PABLOStaking` for unclear usage, thus adding to the centralization risk.
The audit on TrustblockThe change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.
The audit on TrustblockThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=353 address public PABLOStaking = address(0); ``` - The contract `ERC20` interacts with third party contract with `PabloStake` interface via `PABLOStaking`.
The audit on TrustblockThe Pablo DeFi security record · Every Pablo DeFi address · This address on the explorer